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JURISDICTION
This is a Petition for Review of agency action, and the Court
has jurisdiction for appellate review of the agency action pursuant
to Section 63-46b-16(1), Utah Code, together with Section 78-2a3(2) (a), Utah Code.

See also, Rules 3, 4 and 14, Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the Industrial Commission have jurisdiction to enter

any orders while the case was already on appeal?
error standard, no deference.
Industrial

Commission

Hurley

Correction of

v. Board of Review

of Utah Department

of Employment

of

the

Security,

767 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988).
II.

Assuming

the Commission had

jurisdiction, was the

"filing" of ci Request for Reconsideration complete upon mailing?
Correction of error (pure question of law), Hurley,
Dickey,

supra;

State

v.

199 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utcih App. Nov. 3, 1992).

III.

Assuming it had jurisdiction, and further assuming that

mailing the request was insufficient, did the Commission abuse its
discretion in failing to grant a one business day extension to file
Maverik's

Request

for Reconsideration?

Abuse

of

discretion

standard.
IV.

Has there ever been a final order from the Commission?

Correction of error (pure question of law), Hurley,
supra.
1

supra;

Dickey,

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
All of these authorities, as well as certain key cases, are
included in the Appendices
verbatim here).

(and are therefore not set forth

Of particular help in determining this appeal are

the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, relevant portions of which
are included in the Appendix,
Key authorities include Peters

v.

Peters,

394 P.2d 71 (Utah

1964) (except in limited divorce situations, once a matter is
appealed the lower tribunal loses jurisdiction to enter further
orders)•

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a. Nature of Case. This appeal is a Request for Review of
the orders of the Industrial Commission, and specifically the Order
Denying Review issued on March 30, 1992.

It is closely tied to a

prior and still pending appeal of the same Industrial Commission
case, Court of Appeals Docket Number 910413-CA. That other appeal
has been fully briefed and is awaiting oral argument, to be held
simultaneously with argument on this appeal.

b. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Agency
Level.
*

The procedural history is as follows:
February 6, 1989 or earlier - McCord filed her claim with

2

the Division.

Tr. 41, 42. Trial exhibit 3.

* 1990-1991 - For some unexplained reason, the proceedings
languish and are not actively prosecuted.
* February 12, 1991 - "No cause determination" is written on
an official file document, after the Division loses contact with
McCord for a considerable while.1
* February-March, 1991 - The Division's investigation ends
with an opinion that Maverik engaged in handicap discrimination.
*

March, 1991 - Maverik requests a de novo hearing.

* May 15, 1991 - Formal hearing is held.

Afterward, the

parties submitted written closing arguments.
* June 26, 1991 - Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order issued by Antidiscrimination Division Administrative Law
Judge Lisa Michelle-Church. Attached as Appendix A. Although the
decision called itself "final", the ALJ requested that the parties
submit evidence and arguments on attorney fees to aid her in a
later determination of attorney fees. No dollar amount of back pay
or other damage was stated.
*

Appendix A.

July 26, 1991 - Maverik files in this Court its first

Petition for Review, assigning error to those Findings, Conclusions
1

In Gregerson v. Board of Review, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 20,
21 (Utah App. Oct. 28, 1992), a five year delay was reason for
reversal and remand for a new hearing, where the agency delay
deprived the appeals court of a reviewable transcript. Here the
matter has dragged on and on. Three years were consumed for the
"investigation" alone. This, combined with the "no cause
determination" reflected in the Commission file, should result in
dismissal or reversal. Section 34-35-7.1(3)(b), Utah Code
requires, "If no settlement is reached, the investigatory shall
make a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations made in
the request for agency action." Emphasis added.
3

and Order, See Docket Number 910413-CA.

That appeal is ready for

oral argument.2
All of the events below occurred after the Appeal (Request for
Review) was filed and this Court took jurisdiction.
* August 10, 1991 - Since the agency continues to assume and
act as if it had jurisdiction, Maverik requested an opportunity for
discovery

on

reasonableness

of the

attorney

fees and

costs

(totalling about $27,000) sought by McCord.
* September 10, 1991 - ALJ issues Supplemental Order relating
to attorney fees and costs. Appendix B. This order also claims to
be "final", but still no amount of damages is determined or
awarded•
* October 10, 1991 - Maverik seeks Commission review of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and of the
Supplemental Order.
* February 28, 1992 - The Division issues its Order Denying
Review, attached as Appendix C.

In that order the Commission

refused to examine its earlier orders, ruling that Maverik was one
day tardy in its request for Commission reconsideration.

Even

though the first order asked for more information on attorney fees,
the Commission treated the initial order (Appendix A) and the
supplemental order regarding attorney fees (Appendix B) as two
completely separate matters, each being a "final" order.
The Commission held that because no request for agency review

However, the Court has properly determined that these
matters should be argued together after this one is ripe.
4

was filed within 30 days of the first order (an appeal to this
Court was filed instead), it would not entertain reconsideration.
It also refused to reconsider the second order, this time because
Maverik mailed is request for agency review to the Commission on
the 30th day (October 10, 1991) and it was not received by the
Commission until the next business day (October 15, 1991).
*

March

Reconsideration
Appendix D.

19,
of

1992
the

-

Maverik

February

files

2 6th

Order

its

Request

Denying

for

Review.

Maverik pointed out that neither of the orders under

consideration was final.

Page 2.

As a part of the request,

Maverik moved for the one business day extension necessary to take
away any question of timeliness.

c

Disposition at Agency Level.

*

March 30, 1992 - Commission issues its Order

Request

for

Reconsideration.

order appealed from here.

Appendix E.

Denying

This is primarily the

For the first time, the Commission

reverses itself on the issue of finality: "Upon further review, we
agree that the June 26, 1991 order was not final because the issue
of attorney fees was reserved. . . . "

Page 2 (emphasis supplied).

This is the order appealed from here.
Despite this flip flop on finality, the agency still denied
reconsideration because of alleged tardiness in requesting review
of those two orders.
*
Limited

April 3, 1992 - Maverik files with the Commission its
Request

for

Reconsideration,
5

setting forth the agency's

misunderstanding ot law and procedure.

Appendix F.

This request

explains Maverik1s "good cause" for the one day extension.

This

request has not been ruled upon by the Commission.
*

April 6, 1992 - Maverik files its Petition

for

Writ

of

Review with this Court, which is this appeal. Appendix G. Maverik
felt compelled to appeal the March 30th order, since the Commission
called it Mike every prior order) "find I11, .m<l berause that aqemey
has been inconsistent in its holdings and treatment of finality of
orders and time limitations.

a

Statement of Relevant Facts.3

I • Background.

Claimant Vickie McCord was employed for the

first two weeks of October, 1988, is <i part-time (three six-hum
shifts per week) convenience store cashier.

Tr. 38, 52, 55. She

states that she has a "mitral valve prolapse" i"MPV"), a very
common and usually symptom-1 rep heart irregularity.

Tr. 32, 34.

However, there is no medical testimony in the record that she
indeed has that condition.

See, e.g., Tr. 33. McCord was "fine",

and had n appreciable problems with the alleged MPV. Tr. 36, 47,
48, 104, 108.
Maverik manager Connie Jones interviewed and hired McCord. Tr.
38, 54. On the job application McCord indicated she had no heart

3

The facts in this particular appeal are important mostly
just for background, with the possible exception of those having
to do with the alleged tardiness of a reconsideration request.
6

Exhibit4 1, tr. 39, tr.

condition or life-threatening problem.
146-147.

There was evidence that McCord had trouble reading gas pumps
and often smelled of alcohol on the job, but also that she did well
at the till.

Tr. 44, 45, 58, 62, Exhibit 3, 135-136.

Maverik's

employees testified that termination was not the result of a
handicap or perceived handicap.
McCord1s duties included cashier, stocker, janitorial, public
contact and record-keeping, and sometimes she would be required to
work alone in the store.

Tr. 53, 64.

On October 14, 1988 McCord was waiting on customers when she
experienced agitation and chest discomfort while working a shift
alone.

Tr. 66-67.

She told Jones for the first time about her

MPV, and said that it frightened her. Tr. 68. McCord left for the
emergency room, where she was checked and released.
The doctor released her to return to work.
Although

the

details

and

reasons

Tr. 71.
are

terminated McCord later that day. Tr. 72-82.
had heart problems in her family.

Id.

Tr. 68-71.

disputed,

Jones

Jones indicated she

She terminated McCord

because, among other things, she said she felt uncomfortable
leaving McCord alone to work such a stressful job, both physically
and mentally.
termination

Tr. 79-82, 94, 95.

was

because McCord

Exhibit 4.
had

The ALJ found that

a handicap

or

perceived

handicap.

4

References to "Exhibits" are to those introduced at the
formal agency hearing of this matter.
7

McCord made some effort to look for work, Tr. 110-113, Exhibit
but failed in several instances to follow up on nobs, Tr. 132133. She got a janitorial job at Ashley Elementary School a couple
of weeks after she was fired by Maverik, where she worked for two
months.

Tr. 111. She earned more per hour and worked more hours

per week than she had at Maverik

Tr. Ill.

Eventually she quit

her new job because of an unspecified illness.

': - .12.

McCord has no goal of being a convenience store clerk as a
career.

Tr. 132.

At trial, she did not know the difference

between full time and part ti me employ ment ., tr

157, and had no

idea what she earned during the years for which she claims Maverik
owes her wages (late 1988 through 1991). Tr. 258. McCord attended
school, and testified that she expected to begi n working for the
Forest Service.

2.
Findings

Tr. 158-159.

Facts relating
of Fact,

to timeliness.

Conclusions

The Commission's

of Law and Order5 on June 26, 1991,

and its Supplemental Order on September 10. 1991.
Maverik mailed its request that the Commission review its
orders on October 30, 1992, and the document was date stamped at
the Commission on the next business day. The Commission found this
request

to

Reconsideration

be

late,

and

refused

in

its

Order

Denying

(Appendix E) to grant an extension.

5

This document was timely appealed from in Docket #
910413-CA, which appeal remains outstanding and was pending when
each of the Commission's subsequent orders was purportedly
entered.
8

Maverik had requested the one business day extension in its
Request

for Reconsideration.

But its "good cause" for an extension

was best set forth in its April 3, 1992 Limited
Reconsideration.

Appendix F.

Request

for

The good cause includes:

*

the arbitrariness of the Commission's conduct,

*

shortness of the extension sought,

*

the fact the case was already on appeal,

*

the vague and undefined nature of the term "issuance"6,

*

the equally vague nature of the term "filing",

* the fact the days of "lateness" included a Saturday, a
Sunday and Columbus Day, October 14th,
* The Supplemental Order was received by Maverik's counsel by
mail, and the reconsideration request was actually received by the
Commission about 28 days after its receipt by mail,
* the fact that at the time the ALJ issued her
Supplemental
Order, Maverik's counsel were employed on an emergency basis to
defendant a criminal defendant in a jury trial which began on
September 16, 1992 and lasted for several days (ending in mistrial
after six days).

Foundation

II,

State

of Utah v. Stephen

Cartisano

&

Challenger

90-CR-47, Sixth Circ, Kane County.

* Maverik's counsel had another trial on October 3, 1991
before Judge Daniels of the Third District Court, along with
several other court matters during the time period of September 18
through October 10 (the due date for filing the reconsideration
request).
The Commission has never ruled on the Limited

Request

for

Reconsideration.

6

However, an agency decision is considered "issued" for
judicial review purposes on the date stamped on its face, here
September 10th.

Dusty's

v.

Utah State

Tax Commission,

199 Utah

Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah App. Oct. 30, 1992). This new ruling does
not prevent the previous vagueness of the agency's handling of
the question from being a reason for agency extension of its own
internal review.
9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission has entered various orders, all while their
case was already on appeal.
jurisdiction.

Its orders are void for lack of

In the alternative, the Request

for

Review

was

timely filed. Finally, Maverik showed "good cause" for its one day
extension, and failure to extend the time constitute an abuse of
discretion.
The ALJ has still never ruled on several issues, and to this
day has still never specified the judgment amount. See argument in
briefings ut voipan ion appPri1, Docket # 910413-CA.

ARGUMENT

l. Because the matter was on appeal
lost jurisdiction to act.
any validity.

the Commission

None of its orders or denials have

After the Commission is reversed on the related

appeal7, the matter can be remanded for appropriate action at that
time.
Although Maverik filed a Request for Review and two Requests
for Reconsideration

(see appendices) with the Commission, the

agency's lack ol jurisdiction cannot be waived.

Maverik filed

those documents in an effort to protect itself from a "Catch-2211,

Docket Number 910413-CA
10

following the* Commission's procedure of necessity to avoid losing
its rights.
In June, 1991 the Commission issued its ruling, purporting it
to be final.

When Maverik filed its timely appeal in July, the

case was moved to this Court and remains here until remanded. See,
Rules 3(g) and 14(a), Utah R. App. P., and compare with Rule 36,
Utah R. App. P. (Issuance of Remittitur).

An agency cannot exceed

its jurisdiction.8
While a judicial appeal of agency action is pending, there can
be no review or further action on the original award. Farmer
Co.

v.

Smith,

Department

of

249 Ky. 445, 60 SW2d 929
Labor

& Industries,

Motor

(Ky 1933); Feid

1 Wash.2d

430, 96 P.2d

v.
492

(1939).9

2.

The time for reconsideration or appeal of the

first order has passed.

Maverik chose to appeal, and the

Commission's power to enter to orders or reconsider terminated.
See 2 AmJur2d Administrative

Law Sec. 530, including notes 18 and

19, and cases there cited.
The non-agency corollary of this rule has been affirmed in
Utah.

When the issues in a main judgment are appealed, "the

See, Bosquet

v. Howe Scale

Co.,

120 A. 171, 172 (Vt.

1923) .
9

See also,

Traders

& Gen.

Ins.

Co.

v.

Durbin,

119 SW2d 595

(Tex. Civ. App. 1938) and other Texas and Florida cases cited at
165 ALR 26 111(e). See also contra cases from Connecticut,
Georgia, New Mexico and New Jersey at same location.
11

Peters

district court is indeed without jurisdiction as to them«"
v.

Peters,

394 P. 2d 71, 73 (Utah 1964).

divorce judgment is like other judgments."
Peters

was a divorce case.

"In this respect the
Id.

While the decree was on appeal,

the trial court adjusted the rights of the parties based on changed
circumstances.

The Supreme Court held that this was proper only

because of the unique nature of family .1 aw, and because there had
been a change of the family circumstances.

A copy of Peters

is

attached as Appendix H. It clearly operates on the assumption that
fi 1 ing an appea 1 robs the 11: i a 1 conrt of j urI sd Ic11 on unti 1 it i s
remanded.
Outside the divorce arena, once a case is appealed the trial
court has :i 10 jurisdiction to modify the judgment, vacate i t or
enter another.

Davidson

Chevrolet

330 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Colo. 1958).

v. City

and County

The Davidson

of

Denver,

trial court was

held to be i n er :i or for trying to reconsider its judgment after the
appeal was

already

taken.

In this matter,

the

Industrial

Commission entered a supplemental judgment, denied review, denied
reconsideration and changed its mind about the first judgment's
finality, all after that judgment was taken up on appeal.

3. The Commission has created a convoluted mess, it
should have abstained from all action once the appeal was filed,,
Having failed to abstain, the agency should have granted review,
and later reconsideration.
The agency has acted in a way
12

t, hat: is inconsistent

and

confusing at best, and an irrational pattern of conduct at worst.
The Commission has:
With regard to the first appeal,
*

found handicap discrimination without properly considering

what a "handicap" is,
*

entered a "final" order that sets forth no damage amount

(which it still has not calculated), and which reserves the
attorney fee issue for further determination,
*

awarded an attorney fee amount that bears no relationship

to any possible damage award (if one is ever set).
With regard to this appeal,
*

first argued that no Request for Review by that agency was

timely filed, refusing to consider that which was filed, even
though the time limit for such a request is not jurisdictional,
*

argued that the initial order was final and unappealable,

so this Court had no jurisdiction over the first appeal,
*
(query:

then entered a supplemental order awarding attorney fees
"supplemental" to

a

final

order?),

still

stubbornly

asserting that the original order was final,
* then refused to review that order because Maverik's request
was mailed on the due date rather than received,
*

implied that the reason it could not extend the time was

because of Section 34-35-7.1( 11)(b) Utah Code does not permit it,
Appendix C, page five.
*

later acknowledged that the above section only prohibits

the agency from extending the time for judicial review, Appendix E,
13

page two,
he one business day
extension of time Maverik sought, Id.,
*

at the same time (in its fourth formal and again "final"
lolding, '
",npon further review, we agree

order) reversed itsei
that the June
attorney

1991 order was not final because the issue of

fees

>

- •

"

<»,

emphasis added,
* c. it-

n Tit- samr- <-rue* ' ,

"i/'oncess

-

•

; t.r. i* notwithstanding this
•

without c remedy ; , ; alleged late :: , i*.. uf t request t o reconsider
that very order
*

r

can b e final
*

" supplemental" order,
(

.

•

, J I n iw

in t -, HI IfH • in«, 11 nil-,

; valid w i t h o u t ever determining a damage a m o u n t ,

never once distinguished or even dealt w i t h t h e landmark

c .ase o n 1: lai idi c aj: cli sen i mi i la t::i on, 10 nnn HVHII iineut loned 11

n

10

McCord also entirely ignores Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Confer,
674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983). Confer (Appendix H) holds that
handicap discrimination cannot exist unless the job is a "major
life activity." The privilege of worker at a particular kind of
job or for one employer is not a "major life activity." Id. at
635.
By requiring a "major 1ife activity" the legislature
avoided making a discrimination lawsuit out of every termination
based on a physical characteristic. Confer,
61A P.2d at 636.
McCord denied that her goal or chosen occupation is convenience
store clerking. Tr. 132. Without mentioning Confer, the ALJ
ruled that working is a major life activity, so each job loss
constitutes interference with a major life activity. This is
directly against Confer1s holding.
11

Confer o b s e r v e s :
M o s t o r a l l persons have some physical or m e n t a l
d e v i a t i o n s from a norm o r from personal o r employer
a s p i r a t i o n s . Considerations of height, w e i g h t , sensory
14

The Commission has Maverik in a "catch 22".

To issue an

order, repeatedly say it is final, and then months later decide
that it was not final after all, has created minor chaos in this
case.

Yet the agency and McCord would both have the Court dismiss

both of these appeals. To allow such agency error to deny Maverik
its well-asserted appeal rights would violate the open courts
provision of Article I Sec. 11 of the Utah Constitution, as well as
the due process clause of United States Constitution, Amendment
XIV.
Maverik has filed two appeals to this Court, both of which
were timely.

Maverik has moved to consolidate them, and the

Commission has requested the same.

How can either appeal be

dismissed?

4.

The Request for Review was timely submitted.

This issue is not determinative of the appeal, since the Commission
had no jurisdiction to enter orders once the appeal was filed. See
arguments one and two above. However, it is set forth in the event

abilities, speech, pulse rate, blood pressure, and a
whole variety of measures of mental ability are only a
few characteristics whose variations can be deemed
'impairments1 . . . . If the Legislature had intended
that all employer decisions based on any such impairments would be forbidden as discrimination against the
handicapped . . . the statutory definition should have
stopped with the word 'impairment1. Instead, the
definition was limited to those impairments that
'substantially' limit a 'major life activity'.
Confer,
supra, 674 P.2d at 636.
15

the Court finds to the contrary.
necessary

I, c

dcja In not e

1.1M? s p e c i f i c

e\ enl

dates

involved here.
* June 28, 1991 - ALJ Findings, Conclusions and Order, calling
itself "final" but asking for attorney fee evidence, Appendix A,
• Maverik files f Lrst appeal (910413-CA)
* September 10, 1991 - ALJ's Supplemental Order (adding
attorney fees and costs) mailed to Maverik counsel. Appendix B.
This order also calls itself "final".
* October 10, 1991 - Maverik requests review, filed and served
by mail, and was received by the Commission on October 11,
* February 28, 1992 - commission's Order Denying Review,
Appendix C, ruled Maverik tardy, and affirmed the initial July 26,
1991 order and its September ]0, 199] supplemental order.
* March 19, 199
Reconsideration of the4"

Maverik fl les
Appendix D

its Request for

* March 3 0, 199~ Commission's Order Denying Request
Reconsideration
Appendix E. (Appealed from here).12

lor

* April 3, 1992 Maverik files its Limited
Request
Reconsideration
explaining "good cause" for ai 1 extension,13

for

*
Review.

April 6

1 992 - Maverik files this Petition

for Writ of

Appendix G

Rule 6(e), URCP provides for ai 1 extra three days to respond
a rn.-uied document, The Supplemental Order was mailed to Maverik
counsel
The Utah Rules of Ci vi ] Procedure apply
\i I ] special
2

This is the order in which the Commission suddenly,
after months of behaving and announcing to the contrary, reverses
itself on final I ty: "Upon further review, we agree that the June
26, 1991 order was not final because the issue of attorney fees
was reserved. . . . " Appendix E, Page 2. Despite this flip flop
on finality (or, as the agency refers to it, this "concession"),
the agency still denied reconsideration because of tardiness.
13

This request is still pending before the Commission,
despite passage of eight months.
16

statutory

proceedings"

unless

specifically

excluded

by

the

Rule 1(a), URCP.14

applicable statutory scheme.

"Filing" must occur before or within a "reasonable time" after
service.

Rule 5(d), URCP.

This does not apply to jurisdictional

acts, such as filing a complaint or notice of appeal. See, Rule 4
and 5(a), URCP, and Rules 4 and 14, Utah R. App. P.; Isaacson
Dorius,

669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983); Silva

786 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1990).
mailing."

v. Department

of Emp.

v.
Sec,

"Service by mail is complete upon

Rule 5(b)(1), URCP.15

See general discussion in Fed.

Proc. L. Ed. Section 65:138-139.16
Since service is complete if made by mail, and filing must
occur within

a reasonable

time

thereafter,

the

request

for

reconsideration served on McCord's counsel by mail on the 30th day,
and arrived at the Commission for filing on the very next business
day.
14

But see Entre

Nous Club

v.

Toronto,

4 Utah 2d 98, 287

P.2d 670 (Utah 1955), holding that the Rules do not apply to a
proceeding before an administrative body seeking to regulate
activities burdened with a public interest. Here the rights
litigated were private.
15

The Commission's only argument for not applying the
Rules of Civil Procedure to help define "filing" a request in an
ongoing case, is that "Section 63-46b~12(1)(a), clearly
establishes the timing standard for this administrative process."
Appendix E, page 6. However, that statute merely states that an
aggrieved party may "file" its "written request for review within
30 days after the issuance of the order . . . " It begs the
question of what it means to "issue" an order or "file" a
request.
16

"Appellants1 failure to file the motion within this
period thus did not affect its timeliness" so long as it was
filed within a reasonable time after service. Nichols
v.
Asbestos

Workers

Local

24 Pension

Plan,

Cir. 1987), notes 51 to 55.
17

835 F.2d 881, 887 (D.C.

* 1 statute

Mailing of a request must be sufficien
actually r equires that

;*•

*

Section «...*-4 6b- .; / ; " ii:-

and to each party"
is no language evei

- lowing

* j »» ^ • i , i j ni

, -. ; , Utah Code

±n person.

LHHKJ

There

If filing is

Maveri v ' c ^p^vi ce and fi ] :i i lg i s

expressly offered only by
adequate.

ne pre*. _-...-, ofi.icer

In a analogous situation, the Commission has ruled that
11 ni i f; j 11 I!

I 111 i i i * i I

w\ 11 i i i ) i»

111 II ni (i n d l e a p

( I ' ,:i <" * '»" ' 11 * 11 n
i if in ii in 111 "'•' l » "

".led by regular mail, and "[t]he charge shall
* the date of the postmark,

n 1 filed

ieemed filed

regular mai

i -11 - 2 i| I ) ainiil1 («c| Jin (, 111 .111 A d n i 1111 s t r < 1 1 r ' * •

states that the opening request for agency action must be "filed"
within

1-JVQ -T* the alleged discriminatory practice.

Section

3
This Court has recently considered

• - r- - *' --.qnif-cant wav

similar tc • thi s one, and yet cliffererDusty * s i
App. Oct

U tail State Tax C o m m i s s i
30, 111 992,

In Dusty'--

timeliness issue very

,.•--'•
•

,,

Petition for Review by th i s Court uicti wdt> mdxi.ed

faced with un ciie jOth day

after an agency rul :i ng, rather than a Request for Review by the
agency itself, as we have here.
IHi&t

\ " "." 11 CHI iri 1" i Ml n u l l

I I in. ni 1

I In

( J P ! ii [oiit'i

I d e l e r o t ) I rill i i n l

ih»ivi?

i t s t ime extended, because Section 63 -45b-22, U ta h Code provides
t h a t the Commissioner may extend a l l time l i m i t s "except t h o s e time
p«

Rep.

i r p < n f« vii, ll"

'

at 8 9
11

Emphasis a l t e r e d from c i t a t i o n .

y»",

Dusty's

I t was r e c e i v e d by t h e Court oi i the 3 3rd day.
18

pointed out

i

that there may be a different standard in determining timeliness of
a request for agency action, as opposed to judicial reviews.

199

Utah Adv. Rep. at 9.

6. The Commission abused its discretion in refusing
to grant Maverikfs requested one day extension.

Even if

the statute and rules make the request a day late, clearly the
agency abused its discretion by failure to grant Maverik1s request
for a one day extension.

The Commission has not adequately dealt

with the series of reasons which Maverik believes constitute "good
cause.I|18

7. The judgment amount is still unknown. As stated
in Maverik1s briefs, in the related appeal, no dollar amount has
been set. How, can the Commission possibly be upheld? How can the
Commission rule that Maverik has failed to take some post-order
step in a timely manner?

18

See Appendix F. The good cause includes the
arbitrariness of the Commission's conduct, shortness of the
extension sought, the fact the case was already on appeal, the
vague and undefined nature of the term "issuance", the equally
vague nature of the term "filing", the fact the days of
"lateness" included a Saturday, a Sunday and Columbus Day,
October 14th, The Supplemental Order was received by Maverik's
counsel by mail, and the reconsideration request was actually
received by the Commission about 28 days after its receipt by
mail, the fact that at the time the ALJ issued her
Supplemental
Order, Maverik's counsel's heavy workload, including emergency
involvement in a high profile criminal defense in Kane County,
19

Further,

s J nee the fl rst appeal w a s filed (and i in the midst

I I l:»r i ef i ni]) th< Commission reversed itself ,

I ipon I u r t her r ev i ew,

we agree that the June 26, 1 991 order was not final because the
issue of attorney fees w a s reserved

. . .M

for

naap

Reconsideration,

March

Order Denying

Request

^ppendi

Under precisely the same rational, failure *
otherwise establish a damage amount

v~--

calculate or
ndings which

would permit an educated guess as to damages) prevents each of t he
Commission's orders from being valid even ;- w,
•
cour

r agenc\

- •

- ' may or cie:i : I

> supplement, modify

m. • &><=•>:: ox~d^r

"If the findings

omplete the findings .

* new tr in

further proceedings \

w. The Agency's errors are substantial and harmful.
The Court has made clear what the standard of review is, as I s
summarized in Section 63-46b- \J 6, Utah Code (Utah Administrative

Stewart

the case ; •>• looked
Rep,

n

(April, 1992)

igency.
Indeed,

•: Review

requirement

r

"tii ^

.-•:' showing that

Official Comments, Sec. 63-46b-

the Court

may decide

the agency

h a s erroneously

interpreted the law i f the Court merely disagrees with the agency's
interpretation ,
±n<s. v

-

5

Id

ci tied with approval, Morton

i ( » , 8:1 4 I • 2d
20

International,

basic

issues

of

statutory

interpretation

like

defining

a

"substantial" impairment of a "major life activity", no deference
is given to the agency's legal conclusions. Savage
State

Tax Com'n.i,

Industries

v.

811 P.2d 664, 668, 670 (Utah 1991). An error is

harmless only if it so inconsequential that there is "no reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."
Morton,

supra, 814 P.2d at 584.

9. McCord is entitled to a trial
to be the procedure.
construed in Univ.

(Utah 1987) .

de novo.

This used

Sec. 34-35-8, Utah Code (Repealed, 1990)2,

of Utah v.

Industrial

Com'n.,

736 P.2d 630, 632

Since evidentiary rules are relaxed, discovery is

limited, no jury right is afforded and procedure is very relaxed,
due process requires a new trial before a real court.

See, e.g.

Art. I Sec. 11, Utah Constitution (open courts provision).
Maverik is entitled to have its remedy "in due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial . . . and no person
shall be barred from . . . defending before any tribunal in this
State, . . . any civil cause to which he is a party."

Id.

also, Art. I Sec. 10, Utah Constitution (trial by jury) .

See
The

appeal procedure used here, though arguably supported by statute,
is unconstitutional.
The process afforded to Maverik did not protect its due
process rights.

Questions regarding whether the Commission has

2

The termination claimed to be discriminatory occurred in
October, 1988.
21

afforded

c

petitioner

determinet ions

Service

Review

process

-

Board

(Utah App. , May

due

are

questions

» deterence.

(Indus.

Com'n.l,

of

I dw.

Lope?t

The

', < Vareer

188 Utah Adv. Hop.

l'i

:•(.)

?! / , 199 2) .

CONCLUSION
The law and facts require reversal
jur :i sdi ei ion to do what
that the award

if hhis done

Whereff

Commission had
v

- /erik requif

to McCord be vacated, and/or that the

remanded for a i lew trial.

matter

Further, attorney fees and costs should
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Conclusions
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Order

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UADD Case No. 89-0031

VICKY ANN MCCORD,

*

FINDINGS OF FACT,
Charging Party,
vs.
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on May 15,
1991, at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative
Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Charging Party was present and represented by
James W. Stewart, Attorney at Law.
The Respondent was present and
Mitchell Barker, Attorney at Law.

represented

by

This is a claim of discrimination based on handicapped status
brought by Vicky McCord against Maverik Country Stores in
connection with her termination of employment.
The Charge was
filed with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division on October 24,
1988. The Division issued its Determination on January 24, 1991
finding that Respondent had violated the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Act of 1965, as amended, and issued an Order on the same date
requiring Respondent to conciliate the issue.
On February 15,
1991, Respondent requested a formal hearing before the Commission
on the Charge, and the request was granted.
A de novo evidentiary hearing was held, during which sworn
testimony and exhibits were presented.
During the hearing,
several rulings were Bade from the bench, including a denial of
Respondent's oral Motion for Summary Judgment at the close of
Charging Party's case. The Administrative Law Judge also found
that Respondent's corporate officials received adequate notice of
the Charge and subsequent investigation through copies to the

f

TXHSFT
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corporate office. Respondent argued that a handwritten notation by
an unidentified person of "no cause determination" on a letter
dated February 6, 1991 constituted a finding of no cause by UADD
(Exhibit A-16), but the Administrative Law Judge ruled that the
UADD's actual Determination, dated January 24, 1991, was the only
binding agency action on the merits.
The parties expressly
reserved the right to brief the question of attorney's fees
following the issuance of an Order on the merits.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge and the
parties were given time to submit simultaneous closing briefs.
Having received said briefs, and having been fully advised in the
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Vicky Ann McCord (McCord) was hired as a clerk by Maverik
Country Store on September 30, 1988. She was interviewed and hired
by Maverik's Store Manager, Connie Jones (Jones.) Jones had the
authority to hire and fire employees on behalf of Maverik, based on
her testimony and that of her supervisors. McCord,s position was
part-time, working six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.3 5 per
hour. She worked eight shifts during her two weeks of employment,
Exhibit A-17. She was trained by Jones and another employee, Suzie
Jenkins (Jenkins.)
Her duties including cashiering, stocking
shelves, some bookkeeping and customer service.
At the time of hiring, McCord filled out an employment
application (Exhibit A-l), which included a question concerning
physical abilities:
"Do you have any respiratory, circulatory
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap
which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are
applying?11 McCord checked the box marked "no."
The evidence demonstrates that McCord had been diagnosed with
a heart condition known as "mitral valve prolapse" during January,
1988, while living in California.
This diagnosis followed an
episode of tightness in her chest and a racing heartbeat.
She
consulted a Dr. Watkins, whose opinion is not contained in the
evidence. McCord's recollection of that consultation was that the
condition did not present any restrictions on her lifestyle or
employment.
She was given a "beta blocker" medication and
experienced no further problems.
The Administrative Law Judge takes judicial notice of the
generic information on mitral valve prolapse which was placed into
the record by stipulation of the parties as Exhibit A-ll. Said
information states, in part, that "mitral valve prolapse is a
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common and usually benign heart condition... An estimated 4 percent
to 7 percent of the population has MVP... Because MVP is so common,
some authorities believe that the condition is simply a normal
variant in heart structure, rather than a disease as such."
Evidence was also submitted from Dr. Ace Madsen, who examined
McCord after her termination, stating that McCord "is not at risk
because of her heart problems in regard to her working at her job."
(Exhibit A-7)
Dr. Madsen further stated that the mitral valve
prolapse problem, "should not interfere with any athletic or work
related endeavors.••
On October 14, 1988, McCord reported for her shift at noon.
Jones was working in the store office. McCord began working but
felt some tightness
in her chest and grew
increasingly
uncomfortable. She asked Jones if she could leave the store and go
to the hospital to get her heart checked. In response to Jones'
questions, she disclosed the mitral valve prolapse condition.
Jones agreed to allow her time off to seek medical attention.
At the hospital, McCord was examined and her heart was
monitored (Exhibit A-18.) McCord testified that the emergency room
doctor indicated her heart was fine, and suggested a change of her
•'beta blockertf medication. After giving her a new prescription, he
released her to return to work.
While McCord was at the hospital, Jones referred to McCord's
application and noted that no heart condition had been disclosed.
Jones later called the hospital to check on McCord, and could not
obtain any information.
McCord called Jones approximately two
hours later and offered to resume her shift. Jones told her to
stay home and rest. Jones then called McCord back and told her she
needed to come in to the store and discuss the situation with
Jones. McCord grew apprehensive and asked why. Jones stated that
she would prefer not to discuss the matter on the telephone, but
she went on to say that Jones' mother had died from heart problems,
and her son had recently had heart surgery. Jones commented that
she was concerned about the seriousness of McCord's heart problem.
The parties dispute whether or not McCord then came into the
store for a subsequent discussion with Jones, or whether the
termination of employment took place by telephone.
In either
event, a discussion was had between Jones and McCord later that day
concerning McCord's heart condition. Jones asked McCord why she
did not disclose the heart condition on her application. McCord
responded that she did not believe it presented any restrictions on
her performance of the job, and she did not consider it lifethreatening. Jones then reiterated her statements about Jones'
mother and son having heart problems, and stated she would be
afraid to leave McCord in the store alone. McCord stated that she
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did not perceive her condition to be as serious as that of Jones'
mother or son.
Jones then terminated McCord's employment with
Maverik, stating that she would "do better somewhere else.11
On the same day, Jones prepared a Record of Employee
Counseling form as required by Maverik policy (Exhibit A-4) which
states that McCord was terminated, and described the circumstances
in an attached handwritten letter. That letter states in part:
I told her I would worry about her being on the job
alone. She said it would not happen again and I then
told her how could she make that guarantee when she had
to leaver earlier and said she would not remain on the
job.
I also told her my sympathies were with her as my son had
had open heart surgury (sic) July 1st and my mom had died
of heart problems and complications following surgery.
At this time I told her she had not mentioned this at the
interview when asked if she had medical problems that
would interfere with her doing her job.
I then told her it would be best if she looked for other
less stressful employment.
Jones testified in the hearing that the reasons she stated in
Exhibits A-4 and A-5 were the actual reasons she made the decision
to terminate McCord. Exhibit A-5 is Jones' response to the AntiDiscrimination Division investigation.
It states in pertinent
part:
The day I terminated Vicki it was due to many things, all
relating to her inability to handle stress on the job and
do her job accurately...
According to Vicki she told me in the office that her
heart problem was sometimes brought on by stress. A
convenience store clerk is under nothing but stress. Not
only is the pace fast, but you are responsible for
stocking, cleaning during your shift, dealing with
customers and running the cash register...
My opinion at the time I terminated Vicki was that both
physically and mentally she would be more comfortable in
a job that had a slower pace.
There was some testimony at the hearing concerning McCord's
job performance. Both Jones and Jeinkins testified that McCord had
difficulty reading the gasoline pump meters correctly.
McCord
admitted this problem but added that Jones and Jenkins reassured
her that other employees had the same problem during the first few
weeks.
Jenkins and Jones testified that each had customers
complain about the smell of liquor on McCord's breath during work,
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and they smelled it also. Jones stated that she asked McCord on
one occasion if she had been drinking and she denied it. McCord
denied under oath the use of alcohol before working. Jones and
Jenkins testified that McCord was accurate in her cash register
till, and McCord recalled having been complimented on her accuracy.
Despite the above comments, Jones did not mention any claimed
job performance problems with McCord during the termination
discussion. That discussion centered around Jones' perception of
a heart problem.
The Record of Employee Counseling which
documented the termination did not state any other reason for
counseling, although it contained blanks for such reasons as
"intoxication,,f
"personal
conduct,"
"unsatisfactory
work
performance," and "violation of company rules." (Exhibit A-4) It
also contains a statement that McCord's performance was "average."
There is no documentation that Jones ever counseled or disciplined
McCord concerning the performance issues described above.
Substantial testimony was taken on such issues as the other
handicapped employees working for Maverik, and the employment
history of McCord prior to this job, but such matters are deemed
not relevant to the claim of handicapped discrimination.
Respondent's witnesses Robert Child and Dana Dean, both senior
Maverik employees to Jones, testified that Jones did have authority
to hire and fire employees, and that she acted within the scope of
her authority with regard to McCord.
After being terminated by Maverik, McCord pursued other
employment. She testified and introduced evidence showing that she
made application at twenty-six places of employment during 19891991 (Exhibit A-8). She did briefly work at Ashley Elementary
School as a janitor from November, 1988 through January, 1989. She
anticipates working for the Forest Service this year. There was
also some attenuated testimony at the hearing concerning the
allegation that Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements
of a personal nature about McCord to third persons in the Vernal,
Utah area. There is, however, no direct evidence that Maverik or
its employees ever interfered in McCord's ability to seek other
employment.
Based on the testimony of Jones, it is apparent that Jones
retains some hostile feelings toward McCord.
She testified to
making a derogatory personal comment about McCord while waiting to
testify in the hearing. She also admitted during testimony that
she did not consider McCord to be honest nor "a good person."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Utah law provides that it is a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice for an employer to terminate any person,
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otherwise qualified, because of handicap, U.C.A. 34-35-6.
"Handicap" is defined in the rules promulgated thereunder as "a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one of
more of an individual's major life activities. Being regarded as
having a handicap is equivalent to being handicapped or having a
handicap," R486-1-2(F)(1).
"Major life activity" is defined to include experiencing
difficulty in "securing, retainingv or advancing in employment
because of a handicap," R486-1-2(F)(3). "'Is regarded as having an
impairment' means (a) has a physical or mental impairment that does
not substantially limit major life activities but is treated as
constituting such a limitation; (b) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as
a result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or
(c) has none of the impairments listed in the definition of
physical or mental impairment above but is treated as having such
an impairment," R486-1-2(F)(6).
The statute and regulations further provide that "An employer
shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or
employee unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program,"
R486-1-2(J)(1)•
Applying the above law to the facts, the Administrative Law
Judge finds that Maverik Country Stores engaged in a prohibited
employment practice under Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord.
Maverik's termination of McCord rested on its perception of McCord
as handicapped.
There was no evidence that McCord's actual
physical condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a physical
or mental impairment, but it was "treated as constituting such a
limitation," R486-1-2(F)(6)(a) and further, did "substantially
limit major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
others toward such an impairment," R486-1-2(F)f6)(c).
Specifically, Jones' attitude toward persons with heart
conditions was shown to be discrixninatory.
McCord has met her
burden of proof by showing that she was terminated from employment,
the termination was due to her employer'6 perception of her as
handicapped, she was otherwise qualified to perform the work (since
no other reason was given for termination at the time it became
effective), and her employer made no attempt or inquiry regarding
possible accommodations. Her employer did not even seek to obtain
medical advice about the perceived handicap —
its symptoms,
treatment or how it would affect McCord's job performance — before
making the immediate decision to terminate.
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Maverik asserts that McCord failed to meet her burden because
she is not handicapped, and argues the very limited medical
evidence in support of this position. The Administrative Law Judge
concedes that McCord's condition of mitral valve prolapse in this
instance does not appear to present any impairment to McCord's
ability to perform her job. Nevertheless, the law is clearly aimed
at both actual and perceived handicaps.
This is a case where
Manager Jones' perception of handicap (based on Jones' emotional
and unsubstantiated analogy to her own family situation — not on
any medical evidence) was discriminatory in itself.
Maverik also urges the Commission to find that "convenience
store clerking is not a substantial life activity," Respondent's
Closing Brief, p. 6, and therefore, discrimination cannot be found.
Maverik's counsel misses the point of the anti-discrimination laws
and regulations.
Mc Cord testified that she pursued permanent
employment with Maverik as a means of supporting herself and her
son.
It would be absurd for the Commission to cmgage in an
analysis of which types of employment are "career" or "non-career,"
as Respondent argues. "Employment" is clearly listed as a category
in the litany of "major life activities" set forth by Rule, and
McCord's employment was terminated.
Maverik asserts that McCord's performance problems were the
actual reason for termination.
This is not supported by the
evidence.
Manager Jones alone made the decision to terminate
McCord's employment.
The best evidence of her basis for this
decision is the contemporaneous document she prepared at the time,
Exhibit A-4, Record of Employee Counseling, and the reasons she
gave McCord in the termination discussion.
Both state the reason
as McCord's heart problem, and Jones' non-medical perception that
it was related to job stress. Subsequently, Jones has stated that
factors such as pump reading problems, general nervousness, and
possible drinking contributed to the decision to terminate. Since
none of these was discussed with McCord or documented by Jones
prior to termination and this claim being filed, such suggestions
lack credibility. Further, McCord had only worked at Maverik for
two weeks prior to termination, and there is no indication that
these factors had led Jones to consider termination or even
discipline, until the heart condition became known.
Finally, Maverik claims that McCord is not otherwise qualified
to perform the job. McCord was presumably performing the job up
until the moment she asked for the time to go to the hospital, and
her qualifications had not been questioned at that point.
At
11
termination her performance was rated by Jones as "average.
For
Maverik to suggest in hindsight that McCord's qualifications were
lacking begs the question.
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McCord has suffered damages as a result of Maverik's
prohibited employment practice, in that she has been deprived of
wages and benefits of employment.
Utah law states that if an
employer is found to have engaged in a prohibited discriminatory
practice, the Commission shall "issue an order requiring the
respondent to cease any discrimination or prohibited employment
p>ractice and to provide relief to the complaining party, including
reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorney's fees,11 U.C.A.
34-35-7.1(9).
Awards of back pay are governed by federal law, 42 U.S.C.
2 000e-5, and the purpose thereof is to make the party whole for
injuries suffered through discrimination. In this case, back pay
is calculated at a rate of $3.3 5 per hour for 24 hours per week, or
$8 0.4 0 per week. The period of back pay runs from the date of
termination through the date of this Order. While McCord argues
for the use of incremental raises, based on those received by
another employee, the Administrative Law Judge does not find that
probative in McCord's case. The evidence is too speculative to
establish that McCord would have, in fact, qualified for these
incremental raises by passing the tests required.
The
Administrative Law Judge does incorporate by reference the
increases in federal minimum wage, effective April 1, 1990 to $3.80
per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to $4.25 per hour, for
purposes of calculating the back pay award (Exhibit A-12.)
Respondent asks the Commission to terminate McCord's back pay
award as of the date she secured employment as a janitor for Ashley
Elementary School in November, 1988. This employment lasted only
two months.
A review of pertinent case law demonstrates that
victims of discrimination do have a duty to mitigate their back pay
damages by actively seeking other suitable employment, and "Interim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the
person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the
back pay otherwise allowable," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). Therefore,
McCord's back pay award must be reduced by all earnings from
interim employment, including Ashley Elementary School.
However, the Ashley Elementary employment does not toll the
period of back pay since McCord#s employment there was not
terminated voluntarily.
Consistent with case law enunciated in
Bradv v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269 (1985), "the
[back pay] period is tolled when the quit is motivated by personal
reasons unrelated to the job or as a matter of personal
convenience," Id. at 1278.
Since McCord was required to quit
Ashley Elementary due to illness beyond her control, that period of
employment should operate as an offset only against the back pay
award.
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McCord argues that front pay ought to be awarded in lieu of
reinstatement with Maverik Country Stores, due to the hostility
shown McCord by Jones and other employees during the pendency of
these proceedings.
The Administrative Law Judge finds that
reinstatement is still an appropriate remedy, given the fact that
Jones no longer works for Maverik, substantial time has passed
since these incidents and presumably, reinstatement could be
arranged in another Maverik location or capacity.
McCord is entitled to the value of employment benefits she has
lost as a result of the discriminatory termination. No proof was
introduced of the specific Maverik benefit programs to which McCord
could have been entitled, and therefore, none can be awarded based
on the evidence in the record.
The parties reserved the question of an appropriate attorney's
fees award, pending this Order, and shall address that in
supplemental briefs to the Commission.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores is found
liable of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice in the
nature of handicap discrimination against Vicky Ann McCord, and
that Maverik Country Stores cease any discriminatory or prohibited
employment practices immediately;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores provide full
relief to Vicky Ann McCord, including reinstatement to employment
in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with full
rights, privileges and protections of employment;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay to Vicky
Ann McCord back pay, at the rates specified above, from the date of
unlawful termination until the date of this Order, subject to all
lawful offsets due to interim employment;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take 6uch
affirmative action as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from
its environment any employment discrimination prohibited by law;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores not
retaliate against Vicky Ann McCord for having exercised her right
to file this action;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay a
reasonable attorney's fee to counsel for Vicky Ann McCord, subject
to both parties submitting vrritten legal briefs on this question to
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the Commission; McCord's counsel shall submit his brief on
attorney's fees on or before twenty days from the date of this
Order; Maverik's counsel shall submit a response briei, if any, on
attorney's fees on or before twenty days thereafter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take any
other applicable and reasonable relief as may be necessary to
restore Vicky Ann McCord to her rightful position.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake, City, Utah, this
•^/rtlday of
'Jwo-.f
, 1991,
ATTEST:

OL

ir.r-7?* f M ,JL

Patricia O. Ashby_
Commission Secretary

APPENDIX B
Supplemental

Order

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. UADD 89-0031

VICKY ANN MCCORD,
Charging Party,

*

vs.
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE,

*
*

SUPPLEMENTAL
ORDER

Respondent.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On June 26, 1991, an Order was issued in the above case,
finding that Maverik Country Store illegally discriminated against
Vicky Ann McCord on the basis of a perceived handicap. The parties
were granted additional time to submit legal briefs on the amount
of legal fees to be awarded to the prevailing party, pursuant to
U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(9). Said briefs and supporting affidavits have
been received and reviewed by the Administrative Law Judge, who now
enters the following Supplemental Order on the sole issue of
attorney's fees.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Charging Party's counsel has made application for $25,400.50
in attorney's fees and $1,536.26 in costs in connection with the
prosecution of this claim. The attorney's fees represent the work
of three attorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec and Diane Abbeglen,
at the hourly rates of $125, $80 and $80, respectively. The costs
involve mailing, transcribing, witness costs, phone calls, computer
time and copying.
Respondent opposes the award of the attorney's fees as
claimed,
and
alleges that the fees are overstated and
unconscionable.
They note that the entire damage award to Ms.
McCord was only in the range of $8,000, and the fee claimed far
exceeds that amount.
The Administrative Law Judge has carefully reviewed the
pleadings on this issue, and has considered the circumstances of
the case itself, which she heard on behalf of the Commission. She
has also reviewed Utah cases which provide guidance on the award of
attorney's fees, including Travner v. Cushincr. 688 P. 2d 856 (Utah
1984); Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) and fiixi*
State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The attorney's
fees in this case are awarded on the basis of U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(9).
Case law identifies the following key factors to consider in
awarding attorney's fees: relationship of the fee to the amount
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recovered, novelty and difficulty of the issues, overall result
achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate rights,
Travner, supra, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case,
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, customary
fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved, Cabrera, supra. f,The total amount of attorneys
fees awarded in [a] case cannot be said to be unreasonable just
because it is greater than the amount recovered on the contract,"
Cabrera at 625.
This was a relatively straightforward claim of handicap
discrimination, which required a one-day administrative hearing.
No pre-trial proceedings or pleadings were required. Very limited
discovery was conducted, and the majority of the work for the
attorneys on both sides consisted of preparation for, and
attendance at, the actual hearing. It was necessary for Charging
Party to initiate a formal proceeding to vindicate her rights,
since the Respondent had not acknowledged its liability under the
"cause" finding of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division.
The
overall result obtained by Charging Party's counsel was successful,
and the hourly rate billed by counsel was within the customary
range for the Salt Lake City legal community. Charging Party's
counsel was knowledgeable and competent in the area of employment
discrimination law.
However, the Administrative Law Judge finds there was a lack
of efficiency in presenting the case, and the number of hours spent
on particular pleadings was excessive. A disproportionately large
block of Charging Party's attorneys' time was spent preparing
written closing arguments, and later, preparing the brief on
attorney's fees.
This is regrettable, due to the fact that the Administrative
Law Judge customarily hears only oral closing arguments, but herein
made an accommodation to the parties' request and allowed vritten
closing arguments.
Parties in an administrative hearing are
expected to come to the hearing prepared to make both opening and
closing statements orally at the hearing. Certainly it was not
envisioned that allowing a written, instead of oral, presentation
would increase the Charging Party's total legal costs by a factor
of nearly one-third. Moreover, such charges defeat the purpose of
handling discrimination claims in an administrative forum, where
judicial economy is a priority.
The Administrative Law Judge suspects that both parties could
not resist the urge to r«litigate the hearing itself by submitting
extensive written closing arguments. This is very understandable
in light of both attorneys' conduct during the eight-hour hearing,
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in which objections and arguments continually interrupted the flow
of testimony, and there was a notable lack of cooperation between
counsel on even the smallest evidentiary matters.
The
Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that those circumstances left
the impression that perhaps the hearing testimony needed to be represented in written, summary form, and then re-argued as part of
closing arguments.
Unfortunately, this process required 34.10
hours of Mr. Stewart's time, and 36.75 hours of Ms. Krivanec's
time, according to the fee affidavits submitted. That expenditure
of time approaches the amount of hours spent in hearing preparation
itself, and is found to be excessive.
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party's
counsel in connection with the written closing arguments are
partially disallowed as follows: of the 34.10 hours spent by Mr.
Stewart on closing arguments, two-thirds (23 hours) are disallowed;
of the 36.75 hours spent by Ms. Krivanec on closing arguments, twothirds (24 hours) are disallowed. This leaves Mr. Stewart with
106.10 total compensable hours and Ms. Krivanec with 64.40 total
compensable hours.
The balance of the attorney's fees claimed include substantial
time for preparation of the pleadings on the attorney's fee issue
itself: 37.05 hours of Ms. Abbeglen's time at $80.00/hour •*
$2,960.00.
As can be seen from the hearing transcript, the
Administrative Law Judge was very interested in handling the
attorney's fees issue in the simplest and least costly manner. She
asked the parties if they could stipulate to merely submitting
attorney's fees affidavits following her ruling, and not requiring
a further hearing on that single issue. The parties so agreed, and
again, it was not envisioned that by doing so, nearly $3,000 would
be spent on the preparation of those affidavits.
(Respondent's
counsel matched this lack of restraint by filing two separate legal
briefs contesting the award.)
Claims of attorney's fees are
routine and commonly done by large firms such as Charging Party's
counsel. It should not require more than a few hours of organizing
and tabulating bills.
The affidavits from other attorneys in
similar practices are superfluous in an administrative forum, and
are not necessary unless specifically requested by the ALJ.
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party's
counsel in connection with the legal fees claim are partially
disallowed as follows: of the 37.05 hours spent by Ms. Abbeglen on
the legal fees claim, two-thirds (25 hours) are disallowed, leaving
16.45 total compensable hours.
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The remainder of Charging Party's legal fees are specifically
found to be reasonable and supported by the evidence, and are
awarded to Charging Party as a matter of statutory legal right.
The costs have been examined closely and all appear to be related
to the prosecution of this claim. They are not excessive and were
reasonably necessary for case preparation; therefore, they will be
awarded as claimed.
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge rejects the argument
that Charging Party's fee is unreasonable because it far exceeds
the damage award. Damage awards in employment cases are strictly
limited to lost wages/benefits, and it is not reasonable to expect
that Charging Party's counsel could have prepared and litigated
this case for some fraction of a few thousand dollars. This is
especially true in this case, where Respondent's counsel asserted
many frivolous arguments unsupported by tenets of discrimination
law. The principles at stake in a discrimination case render it
more valuable to a Charging Party than a mere dollar figure, and
attorneys' fees may exceed the actual damages in many employment
cases.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The attorney's fees claim submitted by Charging Party's
counsel is reasonable and supported by the evidence, with the
exception of two-thirds of the hours spent on written closing
arguments and two-thirds of the hours spent on legal fees
affidavits and briefs. Following such deductions, Respondent shall
be liable for Charging Party's attorney's fees and costs, pursuant
to U.C.A. 35-34-7.1(9).
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Maverik Country Store,
pay the legal fees of Charging Party, Vicky Ann KcCord, in
connection with the handicap discrimination claim before this
Commission, in the amount of $19,731.00.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent, Maverik Country Store,
pay the legal costs of Charging Party, Vicky Ann McCord, in
connection with the handicap discrimination claim before this
Commission, in the amount of $1,536.26.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Revisw of the
foregoing shall be filsd in writing within thirty (30) days of the
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date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Law Judge
Certified on this /ff-Q

day of C% + -Zt^/> ^) , 1991.
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APPENDIX C
Order Denying

Review

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
UADD CASE NO- 89-0031
VICKY ANN MCCORD,
Applicant,
vs.

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
REVIEW

*

MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE,
Defendants.

*
*
*

The Industrial Commission of Utah (IC) reviews the Motion for
Review of the administrative law judge's Order dated June 26, 1991
which was submitted by respondents. The authority for review is
conferred by U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11), and Section 63-46b-12.
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24,
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24,
1991.
Respondent requested
a formal hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), and the request was granted. As a
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10,
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the
Industrial Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and
September 10, 1991.
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order,
and could not therefore contest its provisions.
The relevant facts are as follows. Ms. McCord was hired as a
clerk by the Maverik Country Stores on September 30, 1988. She was
interviewed and hired by Ms. Connie Jones, the store manager. Ms.
McCord worked eight six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.35
per hour during her two weeks of part-time employment. (Exhibit A17). She performed cashiering, bookkeeping, customer service, and
stocking shelves.
She had answered M no M to respondent's employment application
question which asked her "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap
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which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are
applying?" However, Ms. McCord had been diagnosed with a heart
condition called "mitral valve prolapse" while living in California
in January 1988 after she had tightness in her chest and a racing
heartbeat. Ms. McCord related that her doctor had informed her
that the condition required no changes in lifestyle or employment.
She was prescribed a "beta blocker," and she had no further
difficulties.
Both parties stipulated that, among others, "mitral valve
prolapse is a common and usually benign heart condition...." Dr.
Ace Madsen examined Ms. McCord after her termination, and
determined that she was "not at risk because of her heart problems
in regard to her working at her job." Exhibits A-ll, A-7.
While working on October 14, 1988, Ms. McCord experienced some
tightness in her chest and grew increasingly uncomfortable. She
asked her supervisor, Ms. Jones, if she could go to the hospital to
get her heart checked.
Ms. McCord disclosed her mitral valve
prolapse condition to Ms. Jones in response to questions.
While Ms. McCord was at the hospital, Ms. Jones checked Ms.
McCord's application for employment. No heart condition had been
noted by Ms. McCord. The doctor at the hospital indicated that Ms.
McCord's heart was fine, but gave her a prescription for a change
of beta blocker. Although Ms. McCord called about two hours later,
and offered to complete the shift, Ms. McCord was told to stay home
and rest.
It is not clear where the termination of employment took
place. There is some dispute about whether the termination took
place over the telephone or at the store, but Ms. McCord was
apparently called or summoned to the store by Ms. Jones on the same
day as the hospital episode. During several of the discussions
between Ms. Jones and Ms. McCord which took place on that day, Ms.
Jones stated that her mother had died from heart problems, and her
son had recently had open heart surgery. During the termination
discussion, Ms. Jones expressed concern about the seriousness of
Ms. McCord's heart problems. Ms. Jones then asked Ms. McCord why
she did not disclose the heart condition on her application.
Ms.
McCord replied that she believed that it presented no restrictions
on her, and that she did not consider it to be life threatening.
Ms. Jones responded that she (Ms. Jones) would be afraid to leave
Ms. McCord in the store alone. She then terminated Ms. McCord'&
employment.
A Record of Employee Counseling form was completed by Ms.
Jones which describes the circumstances of Ms. McCord's termination
in a typewritten attachment.
Exhibit A-4.
This form and
attachment show that Ms. Jones was greatly concerned about Ms.
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McCord's heart problem, and the potential that Ms- McCord would
have another medical episode under the stress created if she
continued employment at Maverik. Ms. Jones wrote that "I then told
her it would be best if she looked for other less stressful
employment.•• Id.
Ms. Jones stated in response to an inquiry from the UADD
during its investigation that "The day I terminated Vicki it was
due to many things, all relating to her inability to handle stress
on the job and do her job accurately.... •' Exhibit A-5. Again, it
appears that Ms. Jones was focusing in on the stress factor.
At the hearing, some additional factors for termination were
discussed:
1) Ms. McCord's difficulty in reading the gas pump
meters; and, 2) allegations that customers and employees had
complained about smelling alcohol on Ms. McCord's breath during
work. Ms. McCord denied using alcohol before working, and Ms.
Jones and another employee testified that Ms. McCord's cash
register till was accurate.
Significantly, none of these
allegations were discussed during the termination interview, or
were written on the termination form or attachment.
There is no question that Ms. Jones had the authority from
Maverik to hire and fire Ms. McCord.
Ms. McCord testified and introduced evidence that after her
termination she attempted to find employment at 26 employment
locations during 1989-1991. Exhibit A-8. She worked for a short
time as a janitor at an elementary school from November 1988
through January 1989.
Although there was some testimony that
Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements about Ms. McCord
to other persons in the Vernal area, the ALJ found no direct
evidence that Maverik or its employees had ever interfered with Ms.
McCord's ability to seek other employment.
The ALJ then concluded as a matter of law that f,Maverik
Country Stores engaged in a prohibited employment practice under
Utah lav when it terminated Vicky McCord."
The ALJ based this
conclusion on Maverik's perception of Ms. McCord as handicapped.
There was no evidence that McCord's actual physical
condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a physical or mental impairment, but it was 'treated as
constituting such a limitation,' ... and further, did
'substantially limit major life activities only as a
result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment. . . . '
Order, ALJ at 6 (June 26, 1991), citations omitted.
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The ALJ further stated in her application of facts to her
conclusions of law that Ms, McCord was otherwise qualified to
perform the work.
The ALJ then ordered the following in favor of Vicky Ann
McCord and against Maverik Country Stores:
1.
Liability for a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice in the nature of handicap discrimination.
2. An order to Maverik to cease any discriminatory or
prohibited employment practices.
3. Full relief to Ms. McCord including reinstatement to
employment in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with
full rights, privileges and protections of employment.
4. Payment of back pay calculated at $80.40 per week for
2 4 hours per week with the period of back pay running from the date
of termination through June 26, 1991 with increases in pay
commensurate with increases in the federal minimum wage effective
April 1, 1990 to $3.80 per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to
$4.25 per hour, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim
employment.
5. An order to Maverik to take such affirmative action
as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from its environment any
employment discrimination prohibited by law.
6.
No retaliation by Maverik against Ms. McCord for
having exercised her right to file this action.
7. Payment of a reasonable attorney's fee by Maverik to
counsel for Ms. McCord.
8.
Maverik was to take any other applicable and
reasonable relief as may be necessary to restore Ms. McCord to her
rightful position.
9. And, finally, a notice that any Motion for Review of
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within 30 days of June 26,
1991, specifying in detail the particular errors and objections,
and that the order would be final and not subject to review or
appeal unless such a filing were made.
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ISSUE ONE
WHETHER MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES
TIMELY FILED ITS MOTIONS FOR REVIEW?
The ALJ issued her initial Order on June 26, 1991. She then
issued a supplemental order dealing only with attorney's fees on
September 10, 1991. The Request for Review by Maverik was received
by the IC on October 11, 1991. This request was not received
within the 30 days after issuance of the initial order on June 26,
1991, as required by U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(l)(a), and good cause
for the delay has not been shown by Maverik under U.C.A. Section
63-46b-l(9). The latter statute states:
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time
period prescribed in this chapter, except those
time periods established for judicial review.
Thus, the order of June 26, 19 91 cannot be reviewed by the IC, and
therefore becomes the final order of the IC with regard to the
issues addressed within it. U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11)(b).
With regard to the order of September 10, 1991 which related
to attorney's fees, the filing by Maverik of its Request for Review
was mailed by it on October 10, 1991, and was received by the IC on
October 11, 1991. R486-1-4-5 (Utah Admin. Code) requires that a
request for review be submitted in accordance with U.C.A. Section
63-46b-12.
Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) requires an aggrieved party to:
File a written request for review within 30 days
after the issuance of the order with the person
or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule.
The operative portions of the statute above are "file a
written request for review within 30 days...with the person...11 and
"after issuance of the order...." Since issuance of the order is
the first in the sequence of events which triggers the 30 day
period, the nature of issuance roust be determined.
There is little case law construing the meaning of issuance,
but what little there is indicates that issuance of an order is
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synonymous with delivery or mailing. Sunnyside Nurseries, Inc. v.
Agri. Labor Relations Bd.. 156 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155, 93 CA.3d 922.
The Order of the ALJ shows that it was mailed on September 10,
1991. Therefore, the issuance took place on that date.
It has been suggested that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(URCP), Rule 6(e) gives the aggrieved party an extra three days to
file. This reliance is misplaced since Section 63-46b-12(1)(a)
clearly establishes the timing standard for this administrative
process.
Since Maverik's Request for Review was received on October 11,
1991, that is the date of filing. That date was on the 31st day
after issuance, and was not timely. However, the IC will discuss
the remaining issues as raised by Maverik for the benefit of the
parties.
ISSUE TWO
WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS "ERRONEOUSLY
HIGH, AND SHOULD BEAR SOME RELATION
TO THE DAMAGES SOUGHT?"
U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) allows the ALJ to, among other
actions, award attorneys' fees and costs.
The ALJ awarded Ms.
McCord's counsel legal fees of $19,731, and awarded Ms. McCord
$1,536.26 for costs in connection with her claim before the I C
Maverik asserted the issue of whether the fees were
"erroneously high, and should bear some relation to the damages
sought" in its Revised Memorandum Opposing Attorney Fee Award which
was received by the ALJ on August 13, 1991. Ms. McCord's legal
counsel had sought $25,400.50 which was claimed to represent the
work of thr€>e attorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec, and Diane
Abbeglen, at the hourly rates of $125, $80, and $80, respectively.
The ALJ reduced the fees to the amount noted in the immediately
preceding paragraph.
The ALJ correctly used the factors to both award and to reduce
the award based on case law which identified the following key
factors to consider in awarding attorney's fees: relationship of
the fee to the amount recovered, novelty and difficulty of the
issues, overall result achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit
to vindicate rights, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the
case, reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case,
customary fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of
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the attorneys involved.
10, 1991).

Supplemental Order of the ALJ, at 2 (Sep.

Maverik asserts that Ms. McCord will recover approximately
$8,000, and that the attorney's fees are excessive when that
recovery is considered.
The amount in controversy is a factor
only, and it generally takes as much time to try a discrimination
case for an employee making a minimum wage as it does to try one
for a supervisor receiving much more compensation. £f. Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); Cabrera v.
Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985).
Considering all relevant factors, we cannot say that the
amount awarded was excessive based on the ALJ's reasoning to the
effect that this hearing required one full day; that the attorneys
for Ms. McCord carefully documented their hourly charges; that Ms.
McCord had to initiate the hearing to vindicate her rights since
Maverik did not acknowledge its liability notwithstanding the cause
finding issued by the UADD; that the result obtained by Ms.
McCord's counsel who were knowledgeable and competent in employment
discrimination law was successful, and that the fees charged were
within the customary range for the Salt Lake City legal community.
Since Ms. McCord's counsel have not challenged the reduction
of their fees, we will not discuss the reduction except to note
that we find the reduction to be reasonable and appropriate.
For the above reasons, we find the attorney's fees awarded to
Ms. McCord's attorneys to be appropriate in light of the
documentation, expertise and work required in her case.
ISSUE THREE
WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED IN
FAILING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT
OF DAMAGES?
Maverik styled its issue as stated in the heading above, but
more specifically at page 2 of its request asked whether the ALJ
abused her discretion in awarding Ms. McCord lost wages for time
periods "after she acquired a better paying job, which she later
quit?"
It is appropriate to award back pay from the date of the
discrimination until the date of judgement or the date of trial.
Gathercole v. Global Associates, 560 F.Supp. 642, 647 (1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 727 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1984); Wells v. North
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Carolina Bd of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1983)
cert, den. 464 U.S. 1044, 79 L.ed 2d 176, 14 S.Ct. 712. The ALJ
awarded back pay in this instance from the date of termination
until the date of her order.
Federal law governs the award of back pay in other types of
discrimination cases, but is instructive in this case. 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000e-5. The purpose of an award of back pay is to make
the party whole for injuries suffered through discrimination. The
employer is not responsible for losses willingly incurred by Ms.
McCord. Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc.. 753 F.2d 1269, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985). We can find nothing in the file which shows that
Ms. McCord willingly incurred any loss.
When she left her
employment at the elementary school, she did so due to illness
beyond her control. The ALJ correctly required only an offset by
reducing Ms. McCord's award
by all earnings from
interim
employment, including her elementary school job.
We therefore find that the ALJ was correct in law and fact in
light of the entire record.
ISSUE FOUR
DID THE ALJ ERR WHEN SHE
FOUND THAT MAVERIK HAD TREATED
MS. MCCORD AS IF SHE WERE HANDICAPPED?
Maverik asserts that the ALJ erred when she found that Maverik
had treated Ms. McCord as if she were handicapped. The ALJ found
that "Maverik's termination of McCord rested on its perception of
McCord as handicapped." Order of the ALJ, at 6 (June 26, 1991).
Maverik now claims that Ms. McCord is not handicapped since mitral
valve prolapse is a common condition usually accompanied by no
symptoms at all. Trial Brief as incorporated into the Request for
Review, Maverik Country Stores, at 5 (Oct. 11, 1991).
This issue is relevant as it relates to U.C.A. Section 34-356(1) (a) (i) which states in pertinent part:
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice:
for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or
to discharge, demote, terminate any person, ...
because of ... handicap ....
The Utah statutes do not discuss the concept of perceived
handicap. However, R486-1-2 (Utah Admin. Code) was promulgated by
the UADD under the authority of U.C.A. 34-35-5(b), and provides
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that the subject individual will be treated as if he or she has a
handicap where the individual:
Has a record of such an impairment ... or has
been regarded as having, a mental or physical
impairment ....
R486-1-2F5 (Utah Admin. Code).
The Utah Administrative Code further provides that the
individual may be regarded as having a handicap if others think
that he or she has such a disability, or is considered by others to
have a limitation on a major life activity. R486-l-2F6a,b,c (Utah
Admin. Code). A person who has no disability or handicap, but who
is treated by others as if he or she is impaired (perception of
impairment) , may be just as impaired by virture of treatment by
others as one who is actually impaired.
The ALJ correctly found that the termination was due to Ms.
McCord's employer's perception of her as handicapped, and that she
was otherwise qualified to perform the work. Finally, her employer
made no attempt to obtain medical advice as to the perceived
handicap, or whether she could reasonably accommodate Ms. McCord's
perceived medical condition.
We therefore conclude that this asserted issue by Maverik is
without merit, and that the ALJ was correct.
ISSUE FIVE
WHETHER THE ALJ INCORRECTLY
FOUND THAT ANY PERCEIVED
ABNORMALITY CONSTITUTES
A PERCEIVED HANDICAP?
It is clear to us that the ALJ did not find that any perceived
abnormality constitutes a perceived handicap. Maverik misstates
the findings of the ALJ. A finding of abnormality is not required.
Whatever impairment exists must be either a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's
major life activities, U.C.A. Section 34-35-3(9), and where the
impairment does not actually exist either in part or in whole, the
perception must also rise to the level of substantially limiting
one or more of a person's major life activities.
Major life activity is defined as including experiencing
difficulty in "securing, retaining, or advancing in employment
because of a handicap.... •• R486-1-2F3 (Utah Admin. Code).
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A person is regarded as having an impairment when he or she
(a) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities, but is treated as constituting such a
limitation; (b) has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the
attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or (c) has none of
the impairments listed in the definition of physical or mental
impairment above, but is treated as having such an impairment.
R486-1-2F6 (Utah Admin. Code).
Here, Maverik terminated Ms. McCord based on its perception of
the severity of Ms. McCord's medical condition.
Ms. McCord's
condition was probably not an impairment, but her condition was
treated as a serious one by Maverik.
A job is a major life
activity, including clerking at a convenience store, and there is
a legal requirement to reasonably accommodate such employees unless
undue hardship can be shown.
For the above reasons, we conclude that the ALJ met the
requirements of law in light of the whole record.
ISSUE SIX
WHETHER A MEDICAL EXPERT IS
REQUIRED TO TESTIFY BEFORE
A FINDING OF HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION
CAN BE MADE?
Both parties stipulated before the hearing that mitral valve
prolapse is usually a benign condition, and that Exhibit A-ll would
be "authoritative on the condition of Mitral Valve Prolapse...."
Exhibit A-ll.
Having stipulated that this exhibit would be
authoritative as to Ms. McCord's condition, there appears to be no
good reason why a medical expert is required. The question before
the ALJ was not whether Ms. McCord was actually handicapped, but
whether Maverik treated her as if she was disabled. The evidence
is clear that even though Ms. McCord was capable of performing her
job, Maverik's manager perceived her to have a serious heart
problem, and as a result fired her.
No medical expert was required.
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ISSUE SEVEN
WHETHER MS. MCCORD SHOWED THAT
SHE WAS QUALIFIED TO ACT IN THE
JOB?
Maverik contends that Ms. McCord never showed that she was
qualified for the job from which she was terminated. At the time
of Ms. McCord's termination she was told that she was terminated
because of her heart condition. It was only after the termination,
and after an investigation was requested by the UADD, that Maverik
gave any other reasons for Ms. McCord's termination.
While working at Maverik, Ms. McCord's supervisor was
confident enough in her abilities to leave her alone to perform her
duties in the store after only three days of training. Ms. Jones,
her supervisor, had never confronted Ms. McCord with any of the
allegations which were subsequently lodged against her after the
termination. In fact, Ms. McCord was scheduled to work on the day
of her termination alone for most of her shift.
At the hearing, Maverik alleged that Ms. McCord was not
otherwise qualified because of problems she had reading the gas
pumps. However, a witness who worked for Maverik testified that
everyone had problems reading the pump meters.
Ms. McCord
testified that prior to her termination she had learned to read the
meters, and that she had been complimented on her accuracy on the
till.
It is significant that Ms. McCord was apparently performing
her job duties properly until the time that she asked to go to the
hospital, and that her qualifications had not been questioned up to
that point.
This alleged error is therefore without merit, and we find
that the ALJ determinations and conclusions were correct.
CONCLUSION
For all the previous reasons, we find that the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Administrative Law Judge
were correct in law and fact in view of substantial evidence in the
whole record.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the orders of the administrative law judge
dated June 26, 1991, and September 10, 1991 are affirmed.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals
purposes.
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Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
David C. Cundick, #4817
Attorneys for Respondent
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801) 486-9638
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
VICKY ANN MCCORD,
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
Applicant,
UADD Case No. 89-0031

vs .
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE (sic),
Defendant.

TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH:
Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through
counsel, coiries nov; and respectfully requests that the Commission
reconsider its "Order

Denying

Review",

issued on February 28, 1992 •

This Request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code.
The grounds for relief from the order are as follows:
1. Tne Commission has erroneously interpreted section 63-46b1(9) to make the filing of Maverik's Petition for Review untimely,
and to avoid exercise of the Commission's discretion in extending
any such deadline.

The statute expressly applies only to time

EXHIBIT

periods "established for judicial review."

It does not apply to

agency review.
2.

To the extent necessary, Maverik hereby moves for a one

day extension to petition for review by the Commission.
3.
the

June

The Commission has misperceived the law, in holding that
26,

specifically

1991
and

order

of

ALJ

were

The order

was

cannot

appealed

to

the

undetermined.

next

summary

judicial

that

Issues

attorney fees), and damages were not even calculated.
a partial

in

final.

(including

to

reserved

was

order

comparable

expressly

the

judgment, which

level

so

long

as

issues

of
4.

Review,

remain

So long as the agency's order reserves anything to

the agency for further decision, it is not a final order.
Board

be

Sloan

v.

781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Not being a final order, the petition for the Commission

to review it could not have been tardy.
5.
recovery

While

the

commission

acknowledges

that

the

amount

of

is a factor in determining attorney fee reasonableness,

its Order Denying Review fails to expressly consider what effect
the amount of recovery had in this case.

See Order Denying Review,

page seven.
6.

Attorney fees could not have been awarded and cannot be

evaluated for reasonableness with the case in its current posture,
since the amount of principal recovery has not been calculated, nor
2

can it be calculated based on the any order the Commission has
entered to date.
7.

The Commission erred (Order Denying Review, page eight) in

announcing how the damages could be calculated.

It did so based on

assumptions about voluntariness of McCord's losses, without basing
the observation on any finding by the ALJ to that effect.
simply

cannot

be

calculated

without

further

Damages

hearing

and

supplemental findings.
5. The Commission failed to consider the leading cases on the
issues involved, particularly whether McCord can be said to have
been treated "as if11 she were "handicapped."
City
Board

v.
of

of Review,
For

Confer,
Review,

See, e..g. Salt

674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983); Grace
lie

Drilling

P. 2d 63 (Utah App. 1989) and Hurley

Lake
Co.

v.

v.

Board

167 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988).
all

of the

above reasons, Maverik

requests that the

Commission reconsider in full its Order Denying Review.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of March, 1992.

Ronald C. Backer,Mitchell R.
Barker and David C. Cundick
Attorneys for Defendant Maverik
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I hereby certify that on the 19th day of March, 1992, I caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage
prepaid to:
James E. Stewart
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Industrial Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 44580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Benjamin A. Sims
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
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Mitchell R. Barker
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APPENDIX E
Order Denying Request

for

Reconsideration

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-6600
VICKY ANN MCCORD,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

*

MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES,
Respondent.

*
*

UADD No. 89-0031

*

*********************************

The request for reconsideration by the respondent in the
above entitled matter to review its Order Denying Review, issued on
February 28, 1992, having been duly considered under the authority
of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-13 (1953 as amended), the request for
reconsideration is denied for the following reasons:
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24,
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24,
1991.
Respondent requested a formal hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALT), and the request was granted. As a
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10,
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the
Industrial Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and
September 10, 1991.
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order,
and could not therefore contest its provisions.
Maverik Country Stores first contends that the Commission has
erroneously interpreted section 63-46b-l(9) to make the filing of
Maverik's Petition for Review untimely, and to avoid exercise of
the Commission's discretion in extending any such deadline. This
section states:
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause
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shown, from lengthening or shortening any time
period prescribed in this chapter, except those
time periods established for judicial review.
(Emphasis added).
This statute allows a presiding officer to lengthen or shorten
a time period based upon good cause shown. Maverik did not ask the
Commission to lengthen its time period based on good cause shown,
nor did it show any good cause for doing so. As can be seen by its
clear strictures, it applies only to agency review, and not to
judicial review as asserted by Maverik.
We therefore reject
Maverik's first issue.
Next, Maverik asks for a one day extension to petition for
review by the Commission. Again, this request must be rejected
hashed on failure of Maverik to show good cause.
Third, Maverik states that the ALJ order of June 26, 1991 was
not final since issues were specifically reserved in the order and
damages were not calculated.
Upon further review, we agree that
the June 26, 1991 order was not final because the issue of attorney fees was reserved by the following language:
The parties reserved the question of an appropriate attorney's fees award, pending
this Order, and shall address that in supplemental briefs to the Commission.
Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991).
Notwithstanding this concession, Maverik did not meet the
statutory deadline for filing a request for review of the final
order which addressed attorney fees issued on September 10, 1991 by
the ALJ. Again, Maverik has shown no good cause as to why the
Commission should extend the filing time.
Maverik also contends that the order could not have been final
because damages were not calculated. It cites Sloan v. Board of
Review, 781 P. 2d 463 (Ct. App. 1989) for this proposition. We find
that the order of the ALJ was explicit enough to calculate damages
since Ms. McCord was awarded, among other provisions, reinstatement
to employment, and back pay, at the rates specified on page eight
of the ALJ order, from the date of unlawful termination until the
date of the ALJ order, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim
employment. Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991). The offsets are

VICKY ANN MCCORD
ORDER UPON RECONSIDERATION
PAGE THREE
listed on page eight of the order, and the date of termination,
among other findings of fact, are shown on pages two through five.
The monetary damages can thus be reasonably calculated.
The remaining allegations of error were addressed in the
Motion of Review of defendant dated October 15, 1991, and the
Commission again finds them nonmeritorius.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that
defendant is dismissed.

the

Request

for

Reconsideration

of

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals
purposes.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Certified this o3£^day of
' )7?u« l^

ATTEST:

1992.

—^

,

Patricia O. Ashby;
Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I did mail by prepaid first class postage the
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on Vicky Ann McCord, Case
No. 89-0031 on 30 March 1992 to the following:
Mitchell R. Barker
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
James E. Stewart
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Utah Court of Appeals
Case No. 910413-CA
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APPENDIX F
Limited

Request

for

Reconsideration

Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
David C. Cundick, #4817
Attorneys for Appellant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9638
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600

VICKY ANN MCCORD,

!

Applicant,
LIMITED REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION
VS .

;

MAVERIK COUNTY STORES,
Respondent,

|
i
j

Case Number: UADD 89-0031

Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through
counsel, comes now and respectfully requests that the Commission
reconsider

its denial of Maverik1s request that the Commission

lengthen its time within which to file any motion for review by the
Commission of the Supplemental Order of the Administrative Law
Judge, which was issued on or about September

10, 1991.

This

request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code, and is
limited to a request for review of the denial of an extension of
time.

The grounds for relief from the Order are:
1.

The

procedural

events

in this matter

to

date

are

as

follows:
a.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lav and Order was issued,

reserving

attorney

fee

issue

for

later determination, June 26,

1991.
b.
attorney

Supplemental

Order

awarding

approximately

$20,000

in

fees and costs issued by the Adrinistrative Lav Judge,

September 10, 1991.
c.

Request for Review prepared and mailed October 10, 1991

but not received by the Commission until October 15, 1991 (the day
after Columbus D a y ) .
d.

Industrial Commission issues Order Denying Review, finding

in part that Maverik's Motion for Review was untimely, February 28,
1992 .
e.

Maverik files Request for Reconsideration, March 19, 1992,

including therein a Motion for an Extension of Time through August
15, 1992 for filing a Petition for Review.
f.

Commission

Reconsideration,

issues

Order

Denying

Request

including denial of Maverik's request

that

for
the

time period with in which to Request Review be extended, March 30,
1992.
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2. Good cause has been shown and is further shown herein (see
below) .

The good cause previously shown was the fact that the

document was prepared, executed and mailed on October 10, 1991,
which is the due date by statute.
3. Section 63-46b-l(9), Utah Code, permits lengthening of any
time period for action by the Commission
4.

,f

for good cause shown".

The Commission has, for the first time in its Order

Denying Reconsideration, properly found that the original Order of
the Administrative Law Judge Church was not a final order.

See,

Order Denying Reconsideration, March 30, 1992, page 2.

This

changes the entire face of this case and justifies appropriate
review

of

all the matters

at

issue.

The

Commission

having

determined the initial order to be non-final, procedural matters
should be set aside for an initial determination on the merits of
the ALJ's original order.
5.

Further good cause for the extremely short extension

request that is shown as follows:
a.

Most of the "tardy" days are not chargeable to Maverik

under lav.

They include October 12 and 13, weekends, as well as

October 14, Columbus Day.
b.

As pointed out in the Commission's Order Denying Review,

page 5 and 6,

there is little case authority construing what

constitutes "issuance" by the Commission.
3

It is also far from

clear what constitutes "filing" with the Commission.

Because of

these ambiguities and because of the policy of the Commission of
avoiding hyper-formality, extensions should be freely granted when
requested in good faith.
c.

The Supplemental Order for which review was sought by

Maverik was received by counsel for Maverik on September 11 or 12,
1991, 28 or 29 days prior to the preparation and mailing of the
Petition for Review.
d.
and

At about the time the ALJ issued her Supplemental Order,

just

prior

to Kaverikfs

counsel

receiving

the

same, the

undersigned, Mitchell R. Barker, was employed on an emergency basis
to defend a criminal defendant in a jury trial set to start (and
which did start) on September 16, 1991. The case was State of
vs.

Stephen

Cartisano

and Challenger

Foundation

II,

Utah

90-CR-47, Sixth

Circuit Court, Kane County.
e.

From prior to receipt of the Supplemental Order until

September 17, 1991, Mitchell R. Barker and David C. Cundick, who is
the other attorney who is handling this case and who appeared at
the formal hearing

in this matter with Mr. Barker, were both

involved day and night in defense of Stephen Cartisano in that well
publicized trial which was held in Kanab, Utah.

Little time was

taken to eat or sleep, and there was no time to consider items
received in the mail.
4

f.

September 18, 1991, was the first day that Maverik's

counsel were back in the office, after the Cartisano trial ended in
a mistrial. The Cartisano matter is scheduled to be heard again in
May 1992 after a change of venue to West Valley City.
g.

The undersigned had another trial on October 3, 1991

before Judge Daniels in Third District Court, along with several
other in Court and out of Court matters during the period from
September 17, 1991 through October 10, 1991, the date Maverik's
Petition was due and the date it was prepared and mailed.

Those

included several days trying to catch up on office work after the
Cartisano.
h.

On the due date for the Petition, it was not ready and

hand delivered to the Industrial Commission before 5:00 because
virtually the entire day was spent researching and arcjuing before
Judge Mower of the Sixth Circuit Court in Kane County, on the issue
of Cartisanofs successful Motion to Change Venue from Kane County
to Salt Lake County.
6. Under Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code, it appears that on the
due date for intra-agency review a request may be mailed rather
than hand filed. That section states that the request shall "state
the date upon which it was mailed" and "be sent by ©ail to the
presiding officer and to each party11.
1(9), Utah Code.
5

See also Section 63-46b-

7.

This is not a repeat of the prior motion to reconsider, or

a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to reconsider.

An

enlargement of time was first requested on March 19 of this year,
and was denied for the only time on March 30, 1992.
Wherefore, good cause has previously been shown and is here
further shown for the very short extension sought be Kaverik to
make its Petition for Review of the Supplemental Order timely,
despite the fact that it was mailed on the due date and received
shortly thereafter by the Commission.
DATED this 3rd day of April, 1992.
Mitchell R. Barker
Ronald C. Barker
David C. Cundick
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of April, 1992, I caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage
prepaid to:
James W. Stewart
Kay C. Krivanec
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Benjamin Sims
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mitchell R. Barker
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APPENDIX G
Peters

v.

Peters

PETERS v. PETERS

Utah

p

/l

Cite as 304 r.2d 71

15 Utah 2d 413
Morris L. P E T E R S , Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Virginia S. P E T E R S , Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 10059.

Supreme Court of Utah.
July 20, 1904.

Divorce action. The Second District
Court, Weber County, Parley E. Norseth,
J., granted divorce to wife, and husband
appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, T.,
held that divorce court, which had granted
divorce to wite with lump sum award in
lieu of alimony, had jurisdiction, notwithstanding husband's appeal, to grant temporary alimony and counsel fees to defend
appeal, provided that alimony payments
were credited upon lump sum award
Affirmed.

1. Divorce <S=>I30

Evidence in divorce action, including
evidence of husband's conduct tending to
cause wife great mental anguish and distress, justified award of divorce to wife
rather than to husband.
2. Divorce C = 2 4 l

Award to divorced wife of $2,500 in
lieu of alimony was not excessive, where
husband was permitted to retain home and
securities and wife had worked and contributed toward maintenance of home and
paid her own medical and dental bills.
3. Divorce C=^I82

District court is without further jurisdiction as to questions of divorce, child
custody, support money, alimony or property rights when they are once adjudicated and appeal is taken, but has continuing jurisdiction to enforce rights of parties
to meet needs of spouses and children.
4. Divorce O 3 0 9

Subsequent changes or new orders in
support money order must be based on
changed circumstances.

5. Divorce <§^I82

Divorce court, which had granted divorce to wife with lump sum award in lieu
of alimony, had jurisdiction, notwithstanding husband's appeal, to grant temporary
alimony and counsel fees to defend appeal,
provided that alimony payments were credited upon lump sum award. U.C.A.1953,
30-3-5.

Ronald N. Boyce, Salt Lake City, Clayton & Gould, Ogden, for appellant.
La Mar Duncan, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
CROCKETT, Justice:
After a trial, the lower court dismissed
the complaint of plaintiff Morris L. Peters
and granted a divorce to defendant Virginia
5. Peters on her counterclaim; gave her a
lump sum award of $2,500 in lieu of alimony
and $350 counsel fees. After plaintiff filed
notice of appeal, upon supplemental proceeding, the court awarded defendant $50
per month temporary alimony and $300
counsel fees to defend the appeal. Plaintiff appeals from both the judgment and the
supplemental order.
The parties were married on November
6, 1961, in Preston, Idaho, and have since
lived in Ogden, Utah. It was a second marriage for both. Plaintiff Morris was 54 and
defendant Virginia 40 years old. Virginia
had a teenage son, Eddie, by her prior marriage, and Morris had custody of a teenage girl, Jacklyn Peters, whom he and his
former wife had reared. At first both children lived with these parties, but soon
thereafter it proved that Eddie was not welcome in the plaintiff's home, and he went to
live with his own father.
Both plaintiff and defendant were employed. Morris worked for the Ogden
Railroad Company and received about $10,000 per year gross, $6,000 net. Virginia
had worked most of the time during the
marriage and was earning $325 per month
at the time of the divorce.

7 2

Utah

394 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

.- , i
Before their marnagc the p a r t u s had en- d into an antenuptial a g r e e , , , , . In it
defendant Virginia had agreed to rehnquish any rights she would acquire by the
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Supreme Court has, under special circumstances, awaided counsel fees because that
is a matler peculiarly within the knowledge
of the court. 3 But it has neither said, nor
intended to imply, that the trial court could
not make such an award. It is to be noted
that the situation with respect to alimony
or support money is different. The complexities, actual and potential, upon which
such awards must necessarily be based require the taking and consideration of evidence, which this court is neither equipped
nor disposed to do.
[3] Plaintiff's contention that the trial
court was without jurisdiction to make the
order complained of rests upon a misconception as to the judgments appealed from.
It fails to distinguish between the main
judgment in the divorce action and the subsequent order made in the supplemental proceedings. It is true that the main judgment
is a final and appealable judgment as to the
issues therein dealt with. When those questions as to divorce, custody of children, support money, alimony and/or property rights
are therein adjudicated and an appeal is
taken, the district court is indeed without
further jurisdiction as to them. In this
respect the divorce judgment is like other
judgments. But there is another aspect of
a divorce proceeding which is entirely different. After the main judgment is entered
life goes on, and the needs of the spouses
and the children and the duties to fulfill
them continue day after day. In order to
take care of these needs, it is essential that
the trial court have continuing jurisdiction
to enforce the rights of the parties.
It requires but a moment's reflection to
see what a mischievous situation would
exist if. for example, a husband misbehaving in failing to provide, and perhaps in
abusing his wife and/or children, could appeal a judgment and continue the neglect
3. See Ca^t v. Cast. 1 Utah 12s: lliwlriik*
v. Hendricks 01 Utah .">(*.». GT» I\2d f>12;
Prtorson v. Pctorson, 112 Utah 542, 1M)
P.2d 001.
4. Sro Chaffer v . Chaffee, G.°, Utah 2f>1, 225
P. 76.

and abuse during the appeal. The difficulty
could be magnified in various ways depending upon circumstances, including such
facts as that a destitute family, living a
long distance from the state capitol, may
be required to suffer undue delay and hardship, or even left entirely without remedy,
unless the district court could act.
There is no good reason why not, and
every reason why, that court should and
does have continuing jurisdiction in the action over the family's continuing problems
to protect the rights and interests of the
parties. That this is true and was so recognized by the legislature is indicated in
Section 30-3-5, U.C.A1953:
"When a decree of divorce is made the
court may make such orders in relation
to the children, property and parties,
and the maintenance of the parties and
children, as may be equitable; * * *.
Such subsequent changes or new orders
may be made by the court w ith respect
to the disposal of the children or the
distribution of property as shall be
reasonable and proper."
(Emphasis
added.)
[4,5] Subsequent changes or new orders, which must be based on changed circumstances, 4 obviously could only be made
by the court in supplemental proceedings
as was done here. Until the plaintiff refused to pay the $2,500 and took the appeal,
the defendant could not have petitioned for
the allowances of which the plaintiff complains upon the basis set forth because the
circumstances giving rise to the need did
not exist until then. Her petition stating
those facts invoked the jurisdiction of thr
court in a new and supplemental proceeding in which it was authorized to make
such further orders as it deemed reasonable, equitable and ju»t under ihc circumstances. 5
5. Sco Cody *. Cody, 47 Vtnli -r>0. ir>4 P.
052, and Oldham v. Oldham. 2S N.M. 1G3,
20s P. 8SG. and aU'o 19 A.L.R.2d 703.
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The main judgment and the order in supplemental proceedings are both affirmed,
provided that the alimony payments of $50
per month are credited upon the $2,500
lump sum alimony award. Costs to defendant (respondent).
HENRIOD, C. J., and McDONOUGH,
CALLISTER and WADE, JJ., concur.

agreement to work for less money. U.C.A
1953, 34-4-9, 34-4-17.
2. Labor Relations <S=H262, 1293

Minimum wage provision for womer
cannot be satisfied either by tips or by express agreement to effect that employee wil"
accept tips or other gratuities in full satisfaction of wages. U.CA.1953, 34-4-9, 344-17.
3. Labor Relations <§=>I262, 1475

15 Utah 2d 418
Vickie J. PIERCE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
George ANAGNOSTAKIS d/b/a The Shah,
and Shah, Inc., Defendant and Appellant.
No. 10081.

Supreme Court of Utah.
July 14, 1904.

Waitress* action against restaurant
owner to recover minimum wages and value
of meals not furnished to her. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Joseph
G. Jeppson, J., entered a judgment for
waitress, and the restaurant owner appealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, J., held
that claim that waitress agreed to be compensated by tips only to conceal her income
from Bureau of Internal Revenue and that
restaurant owner did not know of minimum
wrage or her intention to conceal her income
would not defeat waitress' right to collect
minimum wage for women as provided by
schedule promulgated pursuant to statute.

Claim that waitress agreed to be compensated by tips only to conceal her inconv
from Bureau of Internal Revenue and tha*
restaurant owner did not know of minimum
wage or her intention to conceal her income
would not defeat waitress' right to collect
minimum wage for women as provided by
schedule promulgated pursuant to statute.
U.CA.1953, 34-4-9, 34-4-17.
4. Labor Relations C=>I535

Evidence supported allowance of $82 50
against restaurant owner for meals not
furnished to waitress suing to collect minimum wage due her under regulation requiring that in restaurant occupations one
substantial meal per shift must be furnished
by employer at no cost to employee. U.C.A.
1953, 34-4-9, 34-4-17.
5. Labor Relations €=>I570

Where waitress bringing suit against
employer for minimum wages did not comply with statute providing that person must
have made a demand in writing for sum
not to exceed money found due before court
may award attorneys' fees, the court properly refused to award attorneys' fees to
waitress whose demand substantially exceeded amount awarded by court. U.C.A.
1953, 34-4-1 et seq., 34-9-1.

Affirmed.
I. Labor Relations C=>I278

Statute providing for payment of
minimum wages and schedule promulgated
thereunder by Industrial Commission relating to minimum wage for women and children shows intention to allow collection of
minimum wage even in face of express

Richards, Bird & Hart, Salt Lake City,
for appellant.
James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, for
respondent.
WADE, Justice:
Plaintiff, respondent here, Mrs. Vickie J.
Pierce, brought this action to recover from
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plaintiff was not working at the time of the indicate a reasonable probability that she would
accident Furthermore, there is no evidence that have commenced working after the accident.
plaintiff had a reasonably certam prospect of
In short, plaintiff's contention that section
employment that she would have accepted had 31 A-22-307(l)(b)(i) permits a claimant to collect
the accident not occurred.
benefits merely by showing loss of earning
When construing a statute, we must give effect capacity and nothmg more is not consistent with
to legislative intent, West Jordan v. Morrison, either the statutory language or the policy of the
656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). To that end, we Act.
presume that the Legislature used each term
Affirmed.
advisedly, and we give effect to each term
WE CONCUR:
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Id For assistance in ascertaining the meaning of
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice
statutory language, we look to the background
Christine M. Durham, Justice
and general purpose of the statute. Jamison v.
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
Utah Home Fire Ins, Co., 559 P.2d 958, 959
(Utah 1977).
The No-fault Automobile Insurance Act was
CltCM
enacted M |t|o effectuate a more efficient,
199
Utah
Adv. Rep. 7
equitable method of handling the greater bulk of
the personal injury claims that arise out of
automobile accidents." Utah Code Ann.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
§31-41-2 (1974). PIP benefits are intended to
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
provide
immediate
compensation
for
out-of-pocket expenses and actual loss of
earnings incurred as a result of an accident DUSTY'S, INC.,
Petitioner,
without having to bring a lawsuit. See Jamison,
v.
559 P 2d at 959. Unlike an award of damages
based on negligence, PIP disability benefits are Auditing Division of the UTAH STATE
paid monthly so that claimants can continue to TAX COMMISSION,
meet basic living expenses Utah Code Ann
Respondent.
§11 A-22-109(5) PIP benefits were not intended
"to provide an automatic reward or a 'windfall/ No. 920215
for being involved in an accident by requiring FILED: October 30, 1992
payment when there was no loss actually
suffered . . . ." Jamison, 559 P.2d at 960.
Original Proceeding in this Court
Although Jamison dealt with PIP benefits for
loss of household services, the basic policy
ATTORNEYSreferred to there applies equally to disability
Mark K. Buchi, R Bruce Johnson, William
benefits.
Kelly Nash, Salt Lake City, for Dusty's
In providing limited compensation for "any R. Paul Van Dam, Susan L. Bamum, Salt Lake
loss of gross income and the loss of earning
City, for Tax Commission
capacity per person from inability to work
. . . ," we conclude that the Legislature did not
This opinion is subject to revision before
intend to provide compensation for "loss of
publication in the Pacific Reportei.
earning capacity" unless a claimant has suffered
a direct and specific monetary loss Although the PER CURIAM:
term "loss of earning capacity" may well have a
Dusty's, Inc., brought an original proceeding
broader meaning than "loss of gross income" in this court seeking judicial review from a final
with respect to damages recoverable in a tort Tax Commission order that imposed a sales tax
action for personal injuries, we believe that in on D u t y ' s sale of warranties The Commission
the context of PIP benefits, the Legislature moved for summary disposition on the ground
mtended that "earning capacity," insofar as it that Dusty's petition was untimely. This court
means something more than loss of "gross granted the Commission's motion by minute
income," means income that a claimant, if entry. Before us now is Dusty's motion to
unemployed, was reasonably certam to receive. reinstate the petition for judicial review. We
Thus, if a claimant is unemployed at the time of deny that motion.
the accident, that claimant may have a right to
A brief sketch of the procedural facts is in
disability benefits for a job that he or she would
order. On March 25, 1992, the chairman and
have commenced after the accident, had the
three commissioners of the Commission signed
accident not occurred. But to qualify for such
a document entitled "Findings of Facts,
benefits, a claimant would have to show that a
Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision."
job was available for which the claimant was
Below the signatures appeared the Commission's
qualified and that the claimant would have taken
seal and the following paragraph:
that job.
In the instant case, plaintiff was not working
at the time of the accident, nor did the evidence
REPORTS
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NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after
until April 29. Ergo, says Dusty's, its filing on
the date of this order to file in Supreme
April 27 was timely, irrespective of whether the
Court a petition for judicial review. Utah
statute or the rule is applied.
Code
A n n . § § 6 3 - 4 6 b -1 3 (1 ) ,
Dusty's then proceeds to interpret section
63-46b-14(2)(a).
63-46b-14(3)(a), which requires a petitioner to
On Monday, April 27, thirty-three days after "file a petition for judicial review of final
the date of the order, Dusty's filed in this court agency action within 30 days after the date that
its "Petition for Review of Final Decision of the order constituting the final agency action is
State Tax Commission." In invoking this court's issued." (Emphasis added.) Under that language,
jurisdiction, Dusty's stated, "This Petition is says Dusty's, the order was not issued until
timely made as it is filed withm thirty (30) days Saturday, April 25, and the petition for review
of the final decision of the Commission." was therefore not due until May 25. According
Review by this court was granted, and Dusty's to Dusty's, the crux of the statutory language is
filed its docketing statement. This time, the the word "issued," which is nowhere defined in
jurisdictional invocation claimed that the petition the UAPA.
"was timely filed within thirty days after receipt
The Commission takes the traditional
of notice of the Final Decision of the approach. It argues that the procedures for
Commission pursuant to Utah Ad nun. R. agency action, agency review, and judicial
R861-l-8a[sicl (1992)."
review are all established by the UAPA. Section
The Commission moved for summary 63-46b-14(3)(a) requires that judicial review be
disposition on the ground that the petition had requested withm thirty days after the order on
been filed three days late. Dusty's opposed the final agency action is issued. That date was
motion. This court granted the motion to March 25, and Dusty's petition was therefore
dismiss.
due on Friday, April 24. Its April 27 filing was
Dusty's motion to reinstate the appeal is three (days late. The Commission believes that
grounded in the same arguments as was its this court was therefore correct in dismissing
opposition to summary dismissal, and the Dusty's petition for lack of jurisdiction. And, it
Commission's opposition to reinstatement adds, the statutory time frame is the same as
repeats what it argued in the memorandum that required by rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules of
supporting its motion to dismiss. We first state Appellate Procedure.
the position each side has taken on this
The Commission refers this court to Silva v.
junsdictional issue and then proceed to address Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d
the merit or lack of merit of each.
246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), where a petition for
Dusty's concedes that this court has writ of review was mailed before, but received
jurisdiction to review all final agency actions by the clerk of the court of appeals later than,
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings thirty days after the date of the agency order.
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act The court of appeals dismissed that petition as
(UAPA), Utah Code Ann §§63-46b-l to -22 untimely.
(1989 & Supp. 1992). Dusty's believes,
Finally, the Commission argues that Dusty's
however, that its petition was nonetheless timely reliance on section 59-1-504 and rule R861 -1 -8A
under section 59-1-504 of the Code. Under that is misplaced. Both of those provisions have been
section, says Dusty's, Commission actions superseded by the enactment of the UAPA, as
become final thirty days after the date of mailing set out m section 63-46b-22, which governs
of the Commission's notice of agency action.
judicial review. The Commission believes that
Dusty's goes on to say that the Commission Dusty's fails to distinguish section 59-1-504,
has interpreted section 59-1-504 under rule which the Commission says deals with notices to
R86M-8A of the Utah Administrative Code to taxpayers regardmg the date taxes, interest, and
mean that a party adversely affected by the penalties assessed by the Commission are due.
action may appeal within thirty days after
It appears to this court that the statutory
receipt of notice. Dusty's points out that rule instructions are quite straightforward. In all
14(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure administrative agency cases initiated after
requires a petition for judicial review to be filed January 1, 1988, this court and the court of
within the time prescribed by statute and argues appeals have consistently been guided by the
that the prescribing statute here is section provisions of the UAPA in undertaking judicial
59-1-504, as construed by the Commission in reviews of final agency actions. Utah Code Ann.
ruleR861-l-8A.
§63-460-22.' As the Commission correctly
Dusty's admits that the final Commission points out, under the UAPA, the time periods
order was dated March 25, was mailed March established for judicial review are strictly
26, and was received by Dusty's on March 30. I construed:
Therefore, says Dusty's, pursuant to section
Nothing m this chapter may be interpreted
59-1-504, the order became final thirty days
to restrict a presiding officer, for good
after mailing, or on April 25, a Saturday. But,
cause shown,
from
lengthening or
says Dusty's, because the Commission has
shortening any time period prescribed m this
specifically interpreted the statute as establishing
chapter, except
those time
periods
the time for appeal to be within thirty days of
established for judi cial re view.
receipt of notice, Dusty's petition was not due Utah Code Ann. §63^6b-l (9) (emphasis added).
UTAH ADVAJ> :E REPORTS
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Dusty's petition for writ of review is governed
by section 63-46b-14(3)(a):
A party shall file a petition for judicial
review of final agency action within 30 days
after the date that the order constituting the
final agency action is issued . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Dusty's argument that the date of issue is
ambiguous and subject to several inconsistent
interpretations is not persuasive. The
Commission itself defined the date of issue when
it postscnpted the order with the usual legend
found in all Tax Commission orders:
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after
the date of this order to file m Supreme
Court a petition for judicial review. Utah
Code
Ann.
§§63 -46b-13(1),
63-46b-!4(2)(a).
The Commission chose (he date of the order as
the date of issue. It accorded Dusty's notice of
(he time limitations, and the chosen procedure
was well within the bounds of due process
notions and the Commission's discretion. Most
importantly, it gave Dusty's actual and
constructive notice, and Dusty's ignored that
notice at its penl.
For Dusty's future guidance and the guidance
of all those who petition for judicial review from
agency action, we hold that the date the order
constituting the final agency action issues is the
date the order bears on its face. Support for that
conclusion is found in the UAPA itself. Section
63-46b-21 2 governs agency action on declaratory
orders. After receiving petitions for declaratory
orders, agencies may issue written orders.
Copies of all orders issued in response to
requests for declaratory proceedings must be
mailed promptly to petitioners or other parties.
Inasmuch as declaratory orders have the same
status and binding effect as any other orders
issued in an adjudicative proceeding, it follows
that the differentiation between issuance and
mailing may not be limited to declaratory orders
alone.
We now address Dusty's main point, that its
petition for judicial review must be governed by
section 59-1-504 and rule R861-1-8A in isolation
from the UAPA.
Part 5 of chapter 1, title 59, deals with
petitions for redetermination of deficiencies
before the Commission. Requests for
redetermination are for agency action, not for
judicial
review.
§59-1-501. Once the
Commission has determined a deficiency, the
assessed amount becomes payable within thirty
days from the date of mailing of the notice of
demand from the Commission. §59-1-503.
Section 59 1-504 reads as follows*
The action of the commission on the
tax-payer's petition for redetermination of
deficiency shall be final 30 days after the
date of mailing of the commission's notice
of agency action. All tax, interest, and
penal-ties are due 30 days from the date of
mail-mg, unless the taxpayer seeks judicial
review.3

9

(Emphasis added.)
The authority to redetermine deficiencies lies
with the Commission, which allows taxpayers
thirty days after mailing to remit amounts due.
If the taxpayer disputes the redetermined
amount, payment is suspended, and the taxpayer
deposits the disputed amount instead, as set out
in section 59-1-505. Section 59-1-504 does not
contain time limitations for judicial review.
They are dictated by section 63-46b-14(3)(a).
Rule R861-1-8A of the Administrative Code, 4
as written, purports to govern appeals from
informal adjudicative proceedings, pursuant to
section 59-1-602, and is therefore irrelevant to
the case before us. 5 Another rule, not cited by
Dusty's, does apply to these proceedings. Rule
R861-1-5A of the Utah Administrative Code
provides in relevant part:
M. Orders The Commission will issue a
written order after adjudicatory proceedings
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section
63-460-10.6
Section 63-46b-10 dictates procedures required
to be taken by the presiding officer in formal
adjudicative
proceedings,
which
include
statements of findings, conclusions, reasoning,
relief, notice of right to apply for
reconsideration, and notice of right for judicial
review as well as the time limitation applicable
to that review.
The Commission's notice to Dusty's that its
petition for judicial review would have to be
perfected within thirty days of the Commission's
order was proper under that administrative rule,
and the rule is within the scope and authority of
the statute to which it refers.
To summarize, Dusty's time to seek judicial
review in this court was prescribed by section
63-46b-14(3), requiring it to file its petition for
judicial review within thirty days after the order
constituting final agency action was issued. The
order was issued on the date it bore on its face.
Section 59-1-504 does not govern petitions for
judicial review, and rule R861-1-8A does not
apply.
The motion to reinstate the petition for review
is denied
1.

63-4<>b-22. Transition procedures.
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency
review, and judicial review contained in this
chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative
proceedings commenced by or before an agency
on or after January 1, 1988
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action,
agency review, and judicial review that are in
effect on December 31, 1987, govern all agency
adjudicative proceedings commenced by or before
an agency on or before December 31, 1987, even
if those proceedings are still pending before an
agency or a court on January 1, 1988
2. 63-46b-21. Declaratory orders.
(6)(a) After receipt of a petition for a declaratory
order, the agency may issue a written order[ ]
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(c) A copy of all orders issued in response to
a request for a declaratory proceeding shall be
mailed promptly to the petitioner and any other
parties
(d) A declaratory order has the same status
and binding effect as any other order issued in an
adjudicative proceeding
(Emphasis added )
3 . Section 59-1-504 was amended in 1987 in
conjunction with the enactment of the UAPA, and the
italicized language replaced previous language "unless
taxpayer files within that period an appeal with the tax
division of district court as provided by Part 6,
Chapter 1, Title 59 " 1987 Utah Laws ch 161, §213
The Commission infers from this amendment,
correctly, we believe, that the legislature was aware of
the conflicting tune provisions and brought them in
line with the UAPA As it is now written,
section 59-1-504 applies only to proceedings before
the agency
4. R861-1-8A. Appeal Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Sections 59-1-602, 59-1-505.
A Time of Appeal Within 30 days after
receipt of notice of any order of the Commission,
any party adversely affected thereby may appeal
the order to the proper judicial authority If an
appeal is not timely filed, the order becomes final
at the end of the 30-day period Copies of such
appeal shall be served upon the Commission and
upon the Office of the Attorney General
5. Without ruling on the issue, we agree with Dusty's
that the rule does not appear to track any statute
insofar as it purports, without statutory authority, to
extend the time for appeal to thirty days after receipt
of notice of the Commission's order The authority of
administrative agencies to promulgate rules and
regulations "is limited to those regulations which are
consonant with the statutory framework, and neither
contrary to the statute nor beyond its scope "
Crowther v Nationwide Mut Ins Co , 762 P 2d
1119, 1122 (Utah Ct App 1988) (citing LotUieed
Aircraft v Tax Comm'n, 566 P 2d 1249 (Utah 1977))
6. 63-46b-10.
Procedures
for
formal
adjudicative proceedings—Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing,
or after the filing of any post-hearing papers
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the
time required by any applicable statute or rule of
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and
issue an order that includes
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's
findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence
of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on
facts officially noted,
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's
conclusions of law,
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding
officer's decision,
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the
agency,
(e) a notice of the right to apply for
reconsideration,
(0 a notice of any right to administrative or
judicial review of the order available to aggrieved
parties, and
(g) the time limits applicable to any
reconsideration or review

Provo, Utah
CltOM

199 Utah Adv. Rep. 10
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF TIIE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of
Reed Dwane HUNT,
Deceased.
No. 890469
FILED: November 5, 1992
Fifth District, Iron County
T h e Honorable J. Phillip Eves
ATTORNEYS:
Keith F . Oehler, C e d a r City, for the Estate
and Richard L. Hunt
Lyle R. Drake, St G e o r g e , for D a w n a B .
Bool, Charlene Brown, Jefferson
D.
Goulette
T h i s o p i n i o n is s u b j e c t t o r e v i s i o n b e f o r e
p u b l i c a t i o n in t h e Pacific R e p o r t e r .
H O W E , Associate Chief J u s t i c e :
This is an appeal from an o r d e r construing the
last will and testament of Reed D w a n e Hunt,
deceased, and determining his heirs. T h e trial
court concluded that the will failed to dispose of
any assets of the deceased and directed that his
assets be distnbuted to his heirs as determined
by the in testate succession statutes.
Reed Dwane Hunt died on D e c e m b e r 3 , 1988,
without a surviving wife, children, o r parents.
He had four stepchildren whom he had not
adopted. His nearest heirs a i e two nieces,
Dawna W . Bool and C h a r l e n e B r o w n , and a
nephew, Jefferson D Goulette, appellees herein.
One day before his death, the deceased executed
a preprinted will form on which he had inserted
three typewritten paragraphs.
In the first paragraph, the deceased declared
that he was of sound mind and was acting free
of any duress and that he revoked all prior wills.
T h e second and third paragraphs of the will
provided.
Second: I declare that 1 a m a single m a n ,
and that 1 have four (4) stepchildren.
Richard L. Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt,
Denice M a n e Buckley, and Dennis Ray
Hunt. If, at any time, any person shall be
established by a Court of L a w to be a child
of m i n e , then I give and bequeath to each
such person the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00)
and n o more.
T h i r d : 1 have intentionally and with full
knowledge omitted to provide for any and
all of my heirs and next of kin w h o a r e not
specifically mentioned herein, and 1 hereby
generally and specifically disinherit e a c h ,
any and all persons w h o m s o e v e r claiming to
be o r who may be lawfully determined to be
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Rules
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

486-1-2(f), Utah Admin. Code
486-1-2(g), Utah Admin. Code
3, Utah Rules of Appellate Code
3(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Proc.
4, Utah Rules of Appellate Proc.
14, Utah Rules of Appellate Proc.
14(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Proc.
36, Utah Rules of Appellate Proc.
30(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Proc.
1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Proc.
4, Utah Rules of Civil Proc.
5(a), Utah Rules of Civil Proc.
5(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Proc.

Anti-Discrimination
R475-4M. Baas Period Wages
The wages used for the base period will be those
wages earned during the first four of the last Ave
completed quarters prior to the injury, regardless of
the effective date of the claim.
19tT

35-4-4.5

R486. Anti-Discrimination
R4M.1. ABfl-DboltoiatlkMi Dtrisfcrn RegalatioM Issued
Parswut fe Scctkms 34-35-M2) SJKJ 7-0-4) LUJi
Aio*DiscrtelMUoa Act of 1965, as Aneaded
R4J42. Pre-i^elonMat laqoiry Guide
R4S43. No*«ltsrTt«isHttto» CUMIC to be wed !• Contracts
Eetered i»to by the State of Utah aad Hs Ageactes
R4S4-4. Adverttsiag
R4S4-5. Emptoymeat Agemcies
R4S6-*. Regulation of Practice aad Procedure oa
Employer Reports aad Records

R486-1. Anti-Discrimination Division
Regulations Issued Pursuant to Sections
34-35-5-(2) and 7-<!-4) Utah
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as
Amended
R4S4-M.
R434-1-2.
R4S6-1-3.
Review
R4S4-1-4.

DefiaitioBS
Procedares-Cbarges aail Iavestigitorv File
Procedures - Initial Decisionmaking aad
Procedares-HeaHats

R486-1-1. Definitions

The Following Definitions are in addition to the
statutory definitions specified in U.C.A. 34-35-2.
(a) *Law" means the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Vet of 1965, prohibiting discriminatory or unlawful
rmployment practices.
(b) "Investigator* shall mean the individual designated by the Commission, or Director to investiate complaints alleging discriminatory or prohibited
mployment practices.
(c) He, His, Him or Himself* shall refer to either
!X.

(d) "Handicap* means a physical or mental impirment which substantially limits one or more of an
tdividual's major life activities.
(1) Being regarded as having a handicap is equiilent to being handicapped or having a handicap.
(2) Having a record of an impairment substantia
ly limiting one or more major life activities is
[uivalent to being handicapped or having a hand»P.

(3) Major life activity means functions such as
ring for one's self, performing manuar tasks,
liking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learig, and employment.
(4) An individual will be considered substantially
lited in the major life activity of employment or
trkmg if the individual is likely to experience difulty ui securing, retaining or advancing in emplment because of a handicap.
5) Has a record of such an impairment means
i a history of, or has been regarded as having, a
ntal or physical impairment that substantially
its one or more major life activity.
6) Is regarded as having an impairment means (a)
a physical or mental impairment that does not
stantially limit major life activities but that is
€»CO
i. Uuk

R486-M

treated as constituting such a limitation; (b) has a
physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities only at a result of the
attitudes of others toward such as impairment; or
(c) has none of the impairments listed in the defin*
ition of physical or mental impairmittl above but if
treated as having such an impairment.
(e) 'Qualified handicapped individual* mean* a
handicapped individual who with reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions of
the job in question.
(f) 'Reasonable Accommodation* For the purpose
of enforcement of these rules and regulations the
following criteria will be utilized to* determine a
reasonable accommodation.
(1) An employer shall make reasonable accomnv
odation to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or
employee unless the employer can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program «
(2) Reasonable accommodation for example may
include: (a) making facilities used by the employees
readily accessible to and usable, by handicapped
individuals, and (b) job restructuring, modified
work schedules, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, and other similar actions.
(This will be handeled on a case by case basis)
(3) In determining pursuant to paragraph (1) of
this section whether an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of an
employer's, factors to be considered include:
(A) The overall size of the employers program
with respect to number of employees, number and
type of facilities, and size of budget:
(B) The type of the employers operation, including the composition and structure of the employers:
workforce; and
(C) The nature and cost of the accommodation.
needed.
(4) An employer may not deny an employment
opportunity to a qualified handicapped employee or
applicant if the basis for the denial is the need to
make reasonable accommodation to the physical or
mental limitations of the employee or applicant.
(g) With respect to the definition of sexual harassment, the Anti-Discrimination Division adopts
the federal EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment
as specified in 29 CFR Section 1604.11 (1985) as
amended.
R4S6-1-2. rVocedmes-Charges aad Investigatory
File
COMPLAINTS
The following rules pertain to the procedures'
specified in U.C.A. 34-35-1.1
(a) Charges shall be filed in writing on forms
provided by the Division. The charges shall be'
signed and verified before a notary public or any
other person authorized by law to administer oaths
and take acknowledgments.
(b) The chargesfiledshall contain the following:
(1) The name and address of the party or parties
complaining of the discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice.
(2) The name (so far as it can be determined) and
address of the party or parties alleged to have
committed the discriminatory or prohibited employment practice.
(3) A concise statement pertaining to the alleged
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice,
including the name of the individual who committed
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Rule 2. Suspension of rules.
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, on its own
motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions of
Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, suspend the requirements or provisions of
any of these rules in a particular case and may order proceedings in that case
in accordance with its direction.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4(b) is
added to the list of those rules that the appellate court may not suspend The former list of
rules that the appellate court could not suspend concerned procedures and time limits
that confer jurisdiction upon the court Under
Rule 4(b), the post-judgment motions listed
must be filed in a timely manner in the trial

court. If the motions are not filed in a timely
manner, the appellant may not take advantage
of Rule 4(b) that allows 30 days from the disposition of the motion to file the appeal. Both
appellate courts treat the failure to file postjudgment motions in a timely manner as a jurisdictional defect. Burgers v. Meredith, 652
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Timely filing.
When a motion for summary disposition was
clearly meritorious, it would support a suspen-

sion of the time limitation contained in Rule
10, Utah R. App P. Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d
1142 (Utah Ct. App 1990).

TITLE II.
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF
TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order ^and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
434
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Rule 3

(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the
appeal slj^ll pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed
under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such
name shall be added to the title.
Advisory Committee Note. — The designation of parties is changed to conform to the designation of parties in the federal appellate
courts.
The rule is amended to make clear that the
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-appeal" does not eliminate liability for payment
of the filing and docketing fees. But for the

order of filing, the cross-appellant would have
been the appellant and so should be required to
pay the established fees.
Cross-References. — Circuit courts, appeals from, § 78-4-11.
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120.
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a-51.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of record.
Attorney fees.
Denial of intervention.
Dismissal by trial court.
Filing fees.
Filing of notice.
Final order or judgment.
Judgment nunc pro tunc.
Motion to strike.
New trial.
Partial judgment.
Postjudgment orders.
Purpose of notice.
Review in equity cases.
Summary judgment.
Unsigned minute entry.
Cited.
Absence of record.
There was nothing for the court to review

where the alleged error was not made part of
the record. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials,
Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977).
Attorney fees.
Where plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees
by law, he was entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal in defending his judgment
without the necessity of having to file a cross
appeal. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co.,
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981); Wallis v. Thomas,
632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
Denial of intervention.
Order denying with prejudice an application
for intervention was appealable. Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah
1980).
Dismissal by trial court.
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on
the merits of the issues under Rule 4Kb),
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commission, or board from which the appeal is taken. The term "appellate
court" means the court to which the appeal is taken.
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state
statute as to the appeal or review of an order of an administrative agency,
commission, board, or officer of the state which is inconsistent with one or
more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects, these rules
shall apply to such appeals or reviews.
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as
established by law.
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and abbreviated Utah R. App. P.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, substituted
"trial court" for "district, juvenile, or circuit

court" in Subdivision (a) and "administrative
agency, commission, or board" for "tribunal" in
Subdivision (b).

TITLE II.
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF
TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
16

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 4

(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docketing fee, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1,1992, inserted "and a
copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certifi-

cation by the clerk that the bond has been
filed" and made minor stylistic changes in Subdivision (g).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Extension of time to appeal.
Post-judgment motions.
Cited.
Extension of time to appeal.
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v.
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Post-judgment motions.
In accord with fourth paragraph in bound
volume. DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co.,
182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Ct. App. 1992).
Cited in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824
P.2d 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filled with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court v/ithin 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Attorney fees.
Cross-appeal.
Extension of time to appeal.
Filing of notice.
Filing with county clerk.

Final order or judgment.
Post-judgment motions.
Premature notice.
Reconsideration of order.
Timelnness of notice.
— —Date of notice.
Cited.
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the clerk of the trial court to retain the record or parts thereof subject to the
request of the appellate court. The clerk of the trial court shall transmit a
copy of the order and of the index and the portion of the record not retained by
the trial court to the clerk of the appellate court.
(d) Record for preliminary hearing in appellate court. If prior to the
time the record is transmitted the record is required in the appellate court,
the clerk of the trial court at the request of any party or of the appellate court
shall transmit to the appellate court such parts of the original record as
designated.
Advisory Committee Note. — The amendment keeps the requirement that the court reporter acknowledge the receipt of the request
for transcript. Formerly, that acknowledgment
was to appear at the foot of the request itself.
Rule 12 now treats the acknowledgment as a
separate document. The content of the acknowledgment includes a statement regarding
the satisfactory arrangement for payment.

Until satisfactory arrangements for payment
have been made, the reporter is under no obligation to prepare the transcript,
R u l e 12 is amended to impose upon the court
reporters the same standard of'good cause' and
t n e 8 a m e procedures now applicable to parties
i n seeking an extension of time for preparation
Qf t n e transcript.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error § 439 el seq.
C.J.S. — 4A C.J.S. Appeal and Error
§§ 1082 to 1095.

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 619
to 633.

Rule 13. Notice of filing by clerk of appellate court.
Upon receipt of the index transmitted by the clerk of the trial court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), or Rule 12(b)(2), or Rule 11(f), the clerk of the appellate
court shall file the index and shall immediately give notice to all parties of the
date on which it was filed and the date on which the appellant's brief is due
pursuant to Rule 26.

TITLE III.
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES.
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained;
intervention.
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board, commission, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time
prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order.
The term "petition for review" includes a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend,
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari. The
453
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petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the respondents) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each
case, the agency shall be named respondent, The State of Utah shall be
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated
in the petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the
same order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they
may file a joint petition for review and may thereafter proceed as a single
petitioner.
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for
review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing
the appeal. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by
the petitioner on the named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state
is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding
who have been served.
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate
court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain a concise
statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which
intervention is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Means of filing petition.
Time for filing.
. -...
M
4 ...
Means of filing petition.
Commencing petitioner's appeal requires flling the petition with the clerk. Filing a document requires that the document be deposited
with the court clerk, and not with the post office or other means of delivery. Silva v. Department of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Service upon counsel or other parties is required by this rule, and failure to do so may be
grounds for appropriate sanctions. However,

service of a petition for review or notice of appeal on an opposing party does not substitute
for nor accomplish the act of filing that appeal
with the clerk. Silva v. Department of Emp.
Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
^
Time for filing.
The appeal time commences when the final
agency order issues and not when allegedly received by a party.
The 30-day time period for filing an appeal is
not extended because the agency's decision was
mailed to petitioner and was not received by
petitioner until days after its service. Silva v.
Department of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 553 et seq.
A.L.R. - Court review of bar examiners' de.
.,
. ..
on A T o OJ
cision on applicant s examination, 39 A.L.R.3d
'
Standingof civic or property owners' associa-

tion to challenge zoning board decision (as aggrieved party), 8 A.L.R.4th 1087.
. St*nfntg o f 2 0 n i , n g b o a r d , o f ^ P P ^ l s o r 8 i m i "
la** body to appeal reversal of its decision, 13
A L R 4th 1 ISO
Judicial review of administrative ruling affecting conduct or outcome of publicly regu-
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otherwise ordered by the court. A petition for rehearing will not be granted in
the absence of a request for an answer.
(b) Form of petition; length. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by
Rule 27 and copies shall be served and filed as prescribed by Rule 26. Except
by order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any response requested by
the court shall not exceed 15 pages.
(c) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case.
(d) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing
will not be received by the clerk.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is impose sanctions upon the party or upon counsubstantially redrafted to provide definitions sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a
and procedures for assessing penalties for de- first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid
lays and frivolous appeals.
the conflict created for appointed counsel by
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and
must award damages. This is in keeping with State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the law of these cases, appointed counHowever, the amount of damages — single or sel must file an appeal and brief if requested by
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to the defendant, and the court must find the apthe discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended peal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the apto make express the authority of the court to peal.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error S§ 978 to 984.
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 1408
to 1452.

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 829
to 835.

Rule 36. Issuance of remittitur.
(a) Date of issuance. The remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days after
the entry of the judgment. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed, the
remittitur of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order disposing of the petition. The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed,
enlarged, or shortened by order of the court. A certified copy of the opinion of
the court, any direction as to costs, and the record of the proceedings shall
constitute the remittitur.
(b) Stay, supersedeas or injunction pending review. A stay or supersedeas of the remittitur or an injunction pending application for review may be
granted on motion and for good cause. A motion for a stay of the remittitur or
for approval of a supersedeas bond or for an order suspending, modifying,
restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must
ordinarily be made in the first instance in the court rendering the decision
appealed from. A motion for such relief may be made in the reviewing court,
but the motion shall show that a motion in the court rendering the decision is
not practicable, or that the court rendering the decision has denied such a
motion or has failed to afford the relief which the movant requested, with the
476
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reasons given by the court rendering the decision for its action. Reasonable
notice of the motion shall be given to all parties. The period of the stay,
supersedeas or injunction shall be for such time as ordered by the court up to
and including the final disposition of the application for review. If the stay,
supersedeas, or injunction is granted until the final disposition of the application for review, the party seeking the review shall, within the time permitted
for seeking review, file with the clerk of the court which entered the decision
sought to be reviewed, a certified copy of the notice of appeal, petition for writ
of certiorari, or other application for review, or shall file a certificate that such
application for review has been filed. Upon the filing of a copy of an order of
the reviewing court dismissing the appeal or denying the petition for a writ of
certiorari, the remittitur shall issue immediately. A bond or other security on
such terms as the court deems appropriate may be required as a condition to
the grant or continuance of relief under this paragraph.
Advisory Committee Note. — Counsel
from the entry of the decision of the Court of
should note that the petition for certiorari
Appeals, the motion for the stay must be filed
alone is not sufficient to stay the judgment of
within 14 days of the entry of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. Counsel must also file a
the Court of Appeals or within five days of the
motion to stay the remittitur or for an injunce n t r y Gf a decision regarding a motion for retion or supersedeas. Although the time for fil- hearing,
ing the petition for writ of certiorari is 30 days
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Palmer, 802 P.2d 748 (Utah
App. 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. J u r . 2d Appeal and
Error § 939 to 945.

C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 1869
to 1871
Key Numbers. — Appeal and E r r o r * 3 1140.

Rule 37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal.
(a) Suggestion of mootness. It is the duty of each party at all times during the course of an appeal to inform the court of any circumstances which
have transpired subsequent to the filing of the appeal which render moot one
or more of the issues raised. If a party determines that one or more issues
have been rendered moot, the party shall forthwith advise the court by filing a
"suggestion of mootness" in the form of a motion under Rule 23. If the parties
to the appeal agree as to the mootness of an issue, a stipulation to that effect
should be filed, and unless otherwise directed by the court, the appeal will
then proceed as to the remaining issues; if all issues in the appeal are mooted
and the parties stipulate thereto, the suggestion of mootness shall be presented to the court pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this rule.
(b) Voluntary dismissal. If the parties to an appeal or other proceeding
shall sign and file with the clerk an agreement that the proceeding be dismissed, specifying the terms as to payment of costs and shall pay whatever
fees are due, the clerk shall enter an order of dismissal, unless otherwise
directed by the court. An appeal may be dismissed on motion of the appellant
upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the court.
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(d) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing
will not be received by the clerk.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, in Subdivision
(b), deleted "and copies shall be served and

filed as prescribed by Rule 26" from the end of
the first sentence and added the second and
third sentences.

Rule 36. Issuance of remittitur.
(a) Date of issuance.
(1) In the Supreme Court the remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days
after the entry of the judgment. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed,
the remittitur of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order
disposing of the petition.
(2) In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari.
(3) The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, enlarged, or
shortened by order of the court. A certified copy of the opinion of the
court, any direction as to costs, and the record of the proceedings shall
constitute the remittitur.
(b) Stay, supersedeas or injunction pending application for review to
the Supreme Court of the United States. A stay or supersedeas of the
remittitur or an injunction pending application for review may be granted on
motion and for good cause. A motion for a stay of the remittitur or for approval of a supersedeas bond or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring,
or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must ordinarily be
made in the first instance in the court rendering the decision appealed from. A
motion for such relief may be made in the reviewing court, but the motion
shall show that a motion in the court rendering the decision is not practicable,
or that the court rendering the decision has denied such a motion or has failed
to afford the relief which the movant requested, with the reasons given by the
court rendering the decision for its action. Reasonable notice of the motion
shall be given to all parties. The period of the stay, supersedeas or injunction
shall be for such time as ordered by the court up to and including the final
disposition of the application for review. If the stay, supersedeas, or injunction
is granted until the final disposition of the application for review, the party
seeking the review shall, within the time permitted for seeking the review,
file with the clerk of the court which entered the decision sought to be reviewed, a certified copy of the notice of appeal, petition for writ of certiorari, or
other application for review, or shall file a certificate that such application for
review has been filed. Upon the filing of a copy of an order of the reviewing
court dismissing the appeal or denying the petition for a writ of certiorari, the
remittitur shall issue immediately. A bond or other security on such terms as
the court deems appropriate may be required as a condition to the grant or
continuance of relief under this paragraph.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
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wise agree or the court otherwise directs. If separate appellants support the
same argument, care shall be taken to avoid duplication of argument.
(f) Non-appearance of parties. If the appellee fails to appear to present
argument, the court will hear argument on behalf of the appellant, if present.
If the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear argument on behalf of the
appellee, if present. If neither party appears, the case may be decided on the
briefs, or the court may direct that the case be rescheduled for argument.
(g) Submission on briefs. By agreement of the parties, a case may be
submitted for decision on the briefs, but the court may direct that the case be
argued.
(h) Use of physical exhibits at argument; removal. If physical exhibits
other than documents are to be used at the argument, counsel shall arrange to
have them placed in the courtroom before the court convenes on the date of
the argument. After the argument, counsel shall remove the exhibits from the
courtroom unless the court otherwise directs. If exhibits are not reclaimed by
counsel within a reasonable time after notice is given by the clerk, they shall
be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the clerk shall think best.
Advisory Committee Note. — The former
practice was to presume that argument was
waived unless requested. The amendments
change the practice to presume that argument
is requested unless expressly waived.

The rule incorporates the oral argument prionly classification formerly found in the administrative orders of the Supreme Court,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 697 to 699.
C.J.S, — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1401.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 824.

Rule 30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of decision.
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact
in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court or agency to
supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the
issues presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the
trial court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the findings as
revised. The court may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be
conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine
all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case.
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a
new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be executed.
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. When a judgment, decree, or order is reversed, modified, or affirmed, the reasons shall be
stated concisely in writing and filed with the clerk. Any justice or judge
concurring or dissenting may likewise give reasons in writing and file the
470
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ance of additional time must be made by motion filed reasonably in advance of
the date fixed for hearing.
(d) Order and content of argument. The appellant is entitled to open and
conclude the argument. The opening argument shall include a fair statement
of the case. Counsel will not be permitted to read at length from briefs, records
or authorities.
(e) Cross and separate appeals. A cross or separate appeal shall be argued with the initial appeal at a single argument, unless the court otherwise
directs. If a case involves a cross-appeal, the plaintiff in the action below shall
be deemed the appellant for the purpose of this rule unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise directs. If separate appellants support the
same argument, care shall be taken to avoid duplication of argument.
(0 Non-appearance of parties. If the appellee fails to appear to present
argument, the court will hear argument on behalf of the appellant, if present.
If the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear argument on behalf of the
appellee, if present. If neither party appears, the case may be decided on the
briefs, or the court may direct that the case be rescheduled for argument.
(g) Submission on briefs. By agreement of the parties, a case may be
submitted for decision on the briefs, but the court may direct that the case be
argued.
(h) Use of physical exhibits at argument; removal. If physical exhibits
other than documents are to be used at the argument, counsel shall arrange to
have them placed in the courtroom before the court convenes on the date of
the argument. After the argument, counsel shall remove the exhibits from the
courtroom unless the court otherwise directs. If exhibits are not reclaimed by
counsel within a reasonable time after notice is given by the clerk, they shall
be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the clerk shall think best.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October I, 1992, added "with
priority to cases in which the defendant is incarcerated" to Subdivision (b)(2), deleted for-

mer Subdivision (b)(10), listing "petitions for
review of Public Service Commission orders,"
and redesignated the following subdivisions accordingly.

Rule 30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of decision.
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact
in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court or agency to
supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the
issues presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the
trial court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the findings as
revised. The court may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be
conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine
all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case.
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a
new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be executed.
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RULE

RULE

71A Process in behalf of and against persons
not parties
7IB Proceedings where parties not summoned

78 to 80 {Repealed I

PART IX

PART XI

81
82
83
84

APPEALS.

72 through 76 [Repealed J
PART X

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Applicability of rules in general
Jurisdiction and venue unaffected
(Repealed 1
Forms

85 Title

DISTRICT COURTS AND CLERKS

APPENDIX OF FORMS

77 District courts and clerks

INDEX TO RULES

PART I.
SCOPE OF RULES — ONE FORM OF ACTION.
Rule 1. General provisions.
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the Supreme
Court, the district courts, the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state
of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as
governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in
the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when
the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which
event the former procedure applies.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rules 1 and 86(a), F R C P ,
except that it has been adapted to procedure of
this state
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Children's cases
deemed civil proceedings, § 78-3a-44
Jurisdiction and venue of courts unaffected
by rules, Rule 82

Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, district
courts, circuit courts, and justice courts, Chapters 2, 2a, 3, 4, 5 of Title 78
Supreme Court's rulemaking power, § 78-24
United States, execution of process on land
acquired by, §** 63-8-1, 63-8-3

NOTES TO DECISIONS
apply to a proceeding before an administrative
body seeking to regulate activities burdened
with a public interest Entre Nous Club v
Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P 2d 670 (1955)

ANALYSIS

Applicability
—Administrative body
Federal rules
Noncompliance
Cited

Federal rules.
Since these rules were fashioned after the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper to
examine decisions under the federal rules to
determine the meanings thereof Winegar v
Slim Olson, Inc , 122 Utah 487, 252 P 2d 205
(1953) (construing Rule 41)

Applicability.
—Administrative body.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts
§ 143; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to
352; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 8, 9.
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 54 et seq.; 71
C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408 to 412; 72 C.J.S. Process § 3.
A.L.R. — What constitutes doing business

within state for purposes of state "closed-door"
statute barring unqualified or unregistered
foreign corporation from local courts — modern
cases, 88 A.L.R.4th 466.
Key Numbers. — Courts •=» 21 et seq.;
Pleading «=» 331; Process *=» 4 to 6.

Rule 4. Process.
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the
plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and
served.
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of
time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought against two or
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of them within
the 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial.
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of the
court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the action, and the
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the
name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and
otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time
within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing,
and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by
default will be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the
complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed with the
court within ten days of service. If service is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money or other
relief demanded, and that the complaint is on file.
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served in this
state or any other state or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or
constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the
marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of
service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorney.
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2), (3)
or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to
the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and/or
the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process;
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy
to the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if none
can be found within the state, then to any person having the care and
8
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control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service
the infant is employed;
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy to the person
and to the person's legal representative if one has been appointed and in
the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care,
custody or control of the person;
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated
by the state or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the
person who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be served,
or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case,
promptly deliver the process to the individual served;
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by
statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a
copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found within the
state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having,
an office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of
such office or place of business;
(6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy thereof to
the recorder;
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the county clerk of such
county;
(8) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy to
the superintendent or business administrator of the board;
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the
president or secretary of its board;
(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be
brought against the state, by delivering a copy to the attorney general
and any other person or agency required by statute to be served; and
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any
public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy to
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secretary.
(f) Service and proof of service in a foreign country. Service in a foreign country shall be made as follows:
(1) In the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for
service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery; and upon a corporation,
partnership or association, by delivering a copy to an officer or a managing general agent; provided that such service be made by a person who is
not a party to the action, not a party's attorney, and is not less than 18
years of age, or who is designated by order of the court or by the foreign
court; or
(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served as ordered by
9
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the court. Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed
in these rules for service within this state, or by the law of the foreign
country, or by order of the court. When service is made pursuant to subpart (3) of this subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed
by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court,
(g) Other service. Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be
served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence,
where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to believe that the person to
be served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of process
may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service
by publication, by mail, or by some other means. The supporting affidavit
shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be
served, or the circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the
individual parties. If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of
process by publication, by mail from the clerk of the court, by other means, or
by some combination of the above, provided that the means of notice employed
shall be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the
interested parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable. The court's order shall also specify the content of the process to be served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed
complete. A copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant with
the process specified by the court.
(h) Manner of proof. In a case commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the party
serving the process shall file proof of service with the court promptly, and in
any event within the time during which the person served must respond to the
process, and proof of service must be made within ten days after such service.
Failure to file proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. In all
cases commenced under Rule 3(a)(1) or Rule 3(a)(2), the proof of service shall
be made as follows:
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, United States Marshal, or the deputy of any of them, by certificate with a statement as to the date, place,
and manner of service;
(2) If served by any other person, by affidavit with a statement as to the
date, place, and manner of service, together with the affiant's age at the
time of service;
(3) If served by publication, by the affidavit of the publisher or printer
or that person's designated agent, showing publication, and specifying the
date of the first and last publications; and an affidavit by the clerk of the
court of a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the United
States mail, if such mailing shall be required under this rule or by court
order;
(4) If served by United States mail, by the affidavit of the clerk of the
court showing a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the
United States mail, as may be ordered by the court, together with any
proof of receipt;
(5) By the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be
served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved.
(i) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be
10
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amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued.
(j) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the
process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall state
the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof.
(k) Date of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, the
person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left
for the person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and
shall sign his or her name thereto, and, if an officer, add his or her official
title.
(1) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any proceeding where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court
shall, upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate
the newspaper and authorize and direct that such publication shall be made
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and
shall be published in the English language.
(Amended effective March 1, 1988; April 1, 1990.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4 constitutes a substantia) change from prior practice. The rule modernizes and simplifies procedure relating to service of process. Although
this rule and Rule 3 retain the ten-day summons procedure for commencement of actions,
this rule endeavors to make practice under the
ten-day summons provision more consistent
with practice in actions commenced by the filing of a complaint. The rule retains portions of
prior Rule 4, adopts portions of the present federal Rule 4, and adopts entirely new language
in other areas. The rule eliminates the statement (appearing in paragraph (m) of the prior
rule) that all writs and process may be served
by any constable of the court. In the committee's view, this rule does not properly deal with
the question of who may serve types of process
other than the summons and complaint. In recommending the elimination of paragraph (m),
the committee did not intend to change the law
governing eligibility to serve such other process.
Paragraph (a). This paragraph eliminates
the prior rule's reference to the issuance of
summonses. See paragraph (b). Otherwise the
paragraph is identical to the former paragraph
(a).
Paragraph (b). This paragraph, a substantial
change from the prior rule, requires that in an
action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons, together with a copy of the complaint,
must be served within 120 days of the filing of
the complaint. The time period was borrowed
from Rule 4(j), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Paragraph (c). This paragraph makes minor
revisions to the corresponding paragraph of the
prior rule. In addition to data historically re-

quired to appear in the summons, the address
of the court and information concerning the
plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney are also required.
Paragraph (d). In prescribing the persons
who may serve process, this paragraph eliminates the prior rule's distinction between instate and out-of-state service. The paragraph is
consistent with other changes in the rule designed to simplify and unify practice for instate and out-of-state service. In order to be
eligible to serve a summons or complaint, persons who are not sheriffs or other law enforcement personnel must be at least 18 years of age
at the time of service. For eligibility to make
service in a foreign country, see paragraph (f).
Paragraph (e). This paragraph and paragraphs (0 and (g) simplify, change and reorganize the requirements for methods of service as
they appeared in paragraphs (e) and (f) of the
former rule. Subparagraph (e)(1) presents the
general rule for personal service on individuals
who are not infants, incompetent, or incarcerated. Subparagraph (2) deals with service on
infants and subparagraph (3) with service on
incompetent persons. Subparagraphs (1), (2)
and (3) are patterned after Rule 4(e), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Subparagraph (4)
deals with service on persons who are incarcerated or committed to the custody of a state institution. Subparagraph (5) deals with service
on business entities. Subparagraphs (6)
through (9) change and modernize service on
political subdivisions of the state. Subparagraphs (10) and (11) provide for service on the
state and its departments, agencies, boards
and commissions with only minor changes
from the prior rule.
Paragraph (f). This paragraph provides sev-
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PART II.
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE OF
PROCESS, PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND
ORDERS.
Rule 4. Process.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
notice both to the attorney general and the Department, is applicable, not Subdivision (e)(ll)
of this rule. Lamarr v. State DOT, 183 Utah
Adv. Rep. 53 (Ct. App. 1992).

Applicability of rule.
—Service on state agency.
In an action against the Utah State Department of Transportation, § 63-30-12, requiring

PART III.
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS.
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Effect of failure to deny.
In an action for modification of the custody
provision in a divorce decree, it was appropriate for the trial court to rule on appellee's petition, absent any responsive pleading, and to
accept the allegations in the petition as true in
resolving the threshold requirement of
whether appellant's circumstances had materially changed; however, it does not follow that

appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial
court asked to render a judgment by default
must first conclude that the uncontroverted allegations of an applicant's petition are, on their
face, legally sufficient to establish a valid
claim against the defaulting party. Stevens v.
Collard, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct. App.
1992).

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
state a claim, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his
favor. Mounteer v. Power & Light Co., 823
P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991).

ANALYSIS

Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
—Standard.
Cited.
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.

Cited in Moffitt v. Barr, 181 Utah Adv. Rep.
71 (Ct. App. 1992).

—Standard.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to
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were performed outside the state, 16 A.L.R.4th
1318.
Forum state's jurisdiction over nonresident
defendant in action based on obscene oi threatening telephone call from out of state, 37
A.L R.4th 852
Necessity and permissibility of raising claim
for abuse of process by reply or counterclaim in

same proceeding in which abuse occurred —
state cases, 82 A.LR4th 1115.
Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 507,
Counties *=- 219, Municipal Corporations J>
1029; Process «=» 21, 23, 24, 50 to 58, 63, 64, 82,
84 to 1 LI, 127 to 153, 161 to 165, Schools and
School Dlstnct8 ^ 119 Stateb ^
204

Rule 5, Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules,
every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to
the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand,
offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d),
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be
made on parties in default for failure to appear except as provided in Rule
55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims
for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attachment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named
as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer,
claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the time of its seizure.
(b) Service: H o w made.
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be
made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made
upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or, if no
address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a
copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the party; or
leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or,
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if
the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon
mailing.
(2) A resident attorney, on whom pleadings and other papers may be
served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any foreign attorney
practicing in any of the courts of this state.
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there are unusually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and t h a t any crossclaim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the
18
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Statutes
{All from Utah Code Annotated}
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

63-46b-16(l)
78-2a-3(2)(a)
34-35-7.1(3)(b)
34-35-7.1(11)(b)
34-35-7.1(1)(a)
34-35-7.1(9)
34-35-8
63-46b-12(l)(b)(iv)
63-46b-12(l)(a)
63-45b-22
63-46b-16
63-46b-16(4)

63-46b-16

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except
that final agency action from informal adjudicative proceedings based on a record shall be
reviewed by the district courts on the record

according to the standards of Subsection
63-46b-16(4)" at the end in Subsection (l)(a)
and made minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 315 m a kes the act effective on January 1,
1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,

the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
736
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JUDICIAL CODE

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing
fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial
Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per
annum or fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sentence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-

ficeof a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years
and until a successor is appointed and approved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the
present third and fourth sentences and made
minor stylistic changes,

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
14
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(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment hy ch. 73, effective April 25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) and (b) in
Subsection (1); inserted "resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a);
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); deleted
"notwithstanding any other provision of law"
at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsections (2Kb)
to (2>(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); added
"except those from the small claims department of a circuit court" at the end of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic changes.
The 1988 amendment by ch. 210, effective
April 25. 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i)
The 1988 amendment by ch. 248, effective
April 25, 1988, in Subsection (2)(a), rewrote
the phrase before "except" which had read "the

final orders and decrees of state and local agencies or appeals from the district court review of
them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other
provision of law" at the end of Subsection
(2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2Kb); designated former Subsections (2Kb) to (2Kh) as
Subsections (2)(c) to (2Ki); and substituted
"first degree or capital felony" for "first or capital degree felony" in present Subsection (2K0.
The 1990 amendment by ch. 80, effective
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g),
which read "appeals from orders on petitions
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal
conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony" and made punctuation
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 224, effective
April 23, 1990. inserted the subdivision designation (i) in Subsection (2Mb) and added Subsection (2)(b)(ii), and made related stylistic
changes.
The 1991 amendment, effective J a n u a r y 1,
1992, substituted "a court of record" for "district court" in Subsection (2Kf).
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15,
39-6-16.
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(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and
(e) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, $ 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988,
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1; 1992, ch. 127,
§ 11.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, in Subsection

(4), deleted former Subsections (e) and (f),
which read: "general water adjudication" and
"taxation and revenue; and," respectively,
making related changes; redesignated former
Subsection (g) as Subsection (e); and made stylistic changes in Subsection (e).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Humphrey. 176 Utah Adv.
Rep. 8 (1991).
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
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(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
3

ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT
tion must prove that the stated reasons of an
employer for passing her over were merely a
pretext and not the real reason, it is the ultimate burden of persuasion which she must
carry. She is not required to establish intent as
an element of her prima facie case. However,
after her employer raises a genuine issue of
fact by adducing legitimate reasons for its action, the burden shifts back to the employee,
requiring her to prove that a discriminatory
reason was the basis for the employer's decision. University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n,
736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987).
Although a television station employee presented a prima facie case of age discrimination,
her employer carried its burden of rebuttal by
presenting legitimate reasons for not hiring
her: Her unwillingness to follow orders, to follow through, and to meet budget limitations as
well as deadlines and her inability to work

34-35-7.1

well with others. University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987).
Discrimination in rate of pay.
Discrimination in rate of pay cannot be determined solely on whether a person is doing
the same work with the same degree of competence as other employees; classification, seniority and degree of responsibility employee is required to assume must also be considered; police dispatcher who claimed she had been discriminated against on basis of sex in that she
received less pay than a regular policeman doing the same work was not entitled to relief in
view of the more stringent qualifications and
training required of police officers and the varied nature of their duties. Kopp v. Salt Lake
City, 29 Utah 2d 170, 506 P.2d 809 (1973).
Cited in Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d 83
(Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Sex as a Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification, 1968 Utah L. Rev.
395.
Brighnm Young Law Review. — Accommodation of Conscientious Objection to Abortion: A Case Study of the Nursing Profession,
1982 RY.U. L. Rev. 253.
C.J.S. — 51B C.J.S. Labor Relations § 866.
A.L.R. — Termination of employment because of pregnancy as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 51 A.L.R.3d 254.
Discipline or discharge for sexual conduct as
violative of state fair employment laws, 47
AL.R.4th 863.
When is work environment intimidating,
hostile, or offensive, so as to constitute sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as amended (42 USCS
$ 2000e et seq.), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 252.
Actions under Age Discrimination in Em-

ployment Act (29 USCS §§ 621-634) challenging hiring or retirement practices in law enforcement employment, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 373.
Who is "qualified" handicapped person protected from employment discrimination under
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USCS § 701 et
seq.) and regulations promulgated thereunder,
80 A.L.R. Fed. 830.
Effect of mixed or dual motives in actions
under Title VII (equal employment opportunities subchapter) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
USCS §§ 2000e et seq.), 83 A.L.R. Fed. 268.
Actionability, under federal and state antidiscrimination legislation, of foreign employer's discriminating in favor of foreign
workers in hiring and other employment matters, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 114.
Key Numbers. — Labor Relations «= 884,
885.

34-35-7. Repealed,
Repeals. — Section 34-35-7 (L. 1969, ch. 85,
§ 166; 1979, ch. 139, § 2; 1981, ch. 1, § 1), re-

lating to violations, complaints and procedure,
was repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 189, § 5.

34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim —
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings —
Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination.
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent,
make, sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request shall be verified under oath or affirmation.
93
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(c) A request shall be filed within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred.
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or
vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to
refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the commission a written charge asking the commission for assistance to obtain their
compliance by conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a) Before an adjudicative proceeding is set or held, the commission
shall assign an investigator to the charge to attempt a settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt
impartial investigation of the allegations made in the charge.
(c) During the investigation, the members of the commission and its
staff may not disclose the information gathered during the investigation
or the settlement efforts to any party not involved in the investigation or
the charge itself.
(d) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall conduct
every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear that no
prohibited employment practice has occurred.
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to support
the charge of discrimination or prohibited employment practice, the investigator shall formally report these findings t6 the commission.
(b) (i) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the commission may
issue an order dismissing the charge for no cause of action.
(ii) The aggrieved party may petition the commission for reconsideration.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support
the charges of discrimination or prohibited employment practice, the investigator shall formally report these findings to the commission.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the commission may issue
an order adopting the investigator's report.
(c) The commission may order the parties to meet for conciliation discussions, with a designated employee of the commission present.
(d) If these final conciliation discussions are unsuccessful, or if a party
declines to participate in the conciliation discussions, an aggrieved party
may file a request for reconsideration with the commission.
(e) If the commission receives no timely request for reconsideration
from the respondent, the commission may issue an order requiring the
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practices and provide relief to the charging party.
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who investigated the
matter may not participate in the hearing except as a witness, nor may he
participate in the deliberations of the administrative law judge.
(7) (a) The administrative law judge may advise either party appearing
without representation that obtaining representation to present their
case before the administrative law judge is advisable.
(b) The administrative law judge may postpone the hearing to allow
either party to obtain legal representation.
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(8) The commission or the charging party may reasonably and fairly amend
any charge, and the respondent may amend its answer.
(9) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the administrative law judge
finds that a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice, the administrative law judge shall issue an order
dismissing the action containing his findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
(b) If, the case is dismissed, the administrative law judge may recommend that the respondent be reimbursed for his costs.
(10) The commission may enact rules to govern, expedite, and effectuate
these procedures and its own actions that do not violate the provisions of
Chapter 46b, Title 63, or this chapter.
(11) The procedures contained in this section and Section 34-35-8 are the
exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination because of
race, color, sex, age, religion, national origin, or handicap.
History: C. 1953, 34-35-7.1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 189, § 4; 1987, ch. 161, § 105.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective J a n u a r y 1, 1988, rewrote Subsections (I), (3), (4) and (5), deleted former Subsections (6), (7), (11) and (12) and redesignated
the subsequent subsections accordingly; re-

wrote present Subsection (9); substituted "that
do not violate the provisions of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, or this chapter" for "subject to the
conditions and provisions of this chapter" in
present Subsection (10); and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Procedure at hearing.
Remedies of commission.
Procedure at hearing.
It is not improper for the complainant's case
to be presented by the complainant personally
or by counsel instead of an attorney or agent
for the commission. Beehive Medical Elecs.,
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah
1978).

Remedies of commission.
Under proper circumstances, payment in
lieu of job reinstatement is a permissible affirmative action. Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Damages recoverable for wrongful
discharge of at-will employee, 44 A.L.R.4th
1131.
Rights of state and municipal public employees in grievance proceedings, 46 A.L.R.4th
913.

Reinstatement as remedy for discriminatory
discharge or demonition under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USCS § 621 et
seq.), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 575.

34-35-8. Judicial review — Procedure.
(1) Any complainant, or respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final
order of the commission, including a refusal to issue an order, may obtain
judicial review and the commission may obtain an order of court for its enforcement in a proceeding as provided in this section.
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(2) The proceeding shall be brought in the district court of the district in
which is located the county in which the alleged discriminatory or unfair
employment practice which is the subject of the commission's order was committed, or in which any respondent required in the order to cease or desist
from a discriminatory or unfair employment practice, or to take other affirmative action, resides or transacts business.
(3) The judicial review sought by the person or persons claiming to be
aggrieved by a final order of the commission shall be initiated by filing in the
district court not later than one month after actual service of a copy of the
order of the commission on the aggrieved party or parties, a petition for a trial
de novo in the district court. Within five days after the filing of the petition in
the district court, the petitioner shall cause to be served upon the commission
and upon all persons who appeared as adverse parties at any hearing or
proceeding before the commission a copy of the petition for trial de novo in the
district court. If the addresses of all adverse parties cannot be ascertained by
the petition, the petitioner shall serve copies upon those parties in care of the
commission.
(4) The filing of the petition in the district court operates as a stay of
enforcement of the order of the commission until or unless the district court
dismisses the petition or enters a judgment upon a trial de novo in the district
court.
(5) The petition for a trial de novo shall specify the date of the order and the
parties to the proceeding before the commission. Within 15 days after filing
the petition the commission shall file in the district court where the petition
has been filed the entire case file before the commission containing the formal
complaint, the answer and all other documents and exhibits, together with a
transcript of the hearing before the commission if any of the parties so require. The district court upon motion of any party to the proceeding in the
district court may order the appearance of new parties and require any of the
parties to file new pleadings or allow any amendment to pleadings, or expedite discovery proceedings.
(6) Upon the conclusion of a trial de novo in the district court or other
proceedings which appropriately dispose of all issues of fact and of law, the
district court shall enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment and
decree, which are subject to enforcement upon the application of the commission or any party to the judgment. The parties may waive findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The judgment entered in the district court supersedes any
order made by the commission.
(7) The judgment and order of the court are final, subject to review as
provided by law.
(8) The commission's copy of the testimony shall be available to all parties
for examination at reasonable times, v/ithout cost, and for the purpose of
judicial review of the commission's orders.
(9) The commission may appear in court by its own attorney.
(10) Proceedings in the district court shall be expedited at all stages to final
judgment as far as consistent with justice to all interested parties.
(11) If no proceeding to obtain judicial review is instituted by a complainant or respondent within one month from the service of an order of the commission pursuant to Section 34-35-7 [repealed], the commission may obtain a
decree of the court for the enforcement of the order upon showing that respon96
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dent is subject to the jurisdiction of the commission and resides or transacts
business within the county in which the petition for enforcement is brought.
(12) The provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as applicable and
not in conflict with this chapter, apply to proceedings in the courts under the
provisions of this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 34-35-8, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 85, § 167; 1986, ch. 47, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment rewrote Subsection (7) and made various
stylistic changes in the rest of the section.

Compiler's Notes. — Section 34-35-7, referred to in Subsection (11), was repealed by
Laws 1985, ch. 189, § 5. For present comparable provisions, see § 34-35-7.1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
j ANALYSIS

Jury trial.
Remedies of district court.
Trial de novo.
Jury trial
There is no right to a jury trial at trial de
novo in the district court on appeal from commission's decision on a sex discrimination in
employment case. Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 (IHah 1978)
Remedies of district court.
District court on trial de novo has jurisdiction to impose the same remedies granted by
law to the industrial commission. Beehive

Medical Elecs., Inc. v Industria 1 Comm'n, 583
P.2d 53 (Utah 1978)
Trial d e novo.
The legislature clearly intended that the
court be the fact-finder on review. Thus, the
findings of the commission are superseded by
the findings of the district court, and no particular deference need be given to the former.
University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736
P.2d 630 (Utah 1987).

CHAPTER 36
TRANSPORTATION OF WORKERS
Section
34-36-1.
34-36-2.

Motor vehicles of employers — Safe
maintenance and operation.
Motor vehicles of employers — Rules
and regulations.

Section
34-36-3.
34-36 4.

Carriers and vehicles of I Inited
States exempt.
Agricultural workers exempt.

34-36-1. Motor vehicles of employers — Safe maintenance
and operation.
Every motor vehicle furnished by an employer to be used to transport one or
more workers to and from their places of employment shall be maintained in a
safe condition and operated in a safe manner at all times, whether or not used
on a public highway.
History: C. 1953, 34-36-1, enacted by I
1969, ch. 85, § 168.

34-35-7.1

ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT
History: C. 1953, 34-35-6, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 85, § 165; 1971, ch. 73, § 10; 1973,
ch. 65, 5 1; 1975, ch. 100, § 1; 1979, ch. 136,
§ 3; 1985, ch. 189, $ 3; 1985, ch. 203, § 1;
1987, ch. 206, 5 4; 1989, ch. 155, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, inserted "harass near the beginning of Subsection (l)(a)(i)

and inserted "or harass" near the middle of
Subsection (l)(c) and near the beginning of
Subsection (l)(f)(ii); inserted "pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions" in
several places throughout the section; deleted
a re f er ence to Section 49-7a-39 in Subsection
(4); a n d m a d e m i n o r 8t Hgtic

ch

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Howcroft v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 712 F. Supp. 1514 (D. Utah 1989).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Accommodation requirement under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap, 76 A.L.R.4th 310.
Handicap as job disqualification under state
legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap, 78 A.L.R.4th 265.
Discrimination "because of handicap" or "on
the basis of handicap under state statutes prohibiting job discrimination on account of hand-

ship between supervisor and another, 86
A.L.R. Fed. 230.
Circumstances which warrant finding of con8tructive discharge in cases under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USCS
§ § 6 2 i e t seq.), 93 A.L.R. Fed. 10.
W h e n d o e 8 a d v e r g e employment decision
bfl8ed o n
n.g f o r e i
a c c e n t c ( m 8 t i t u t e na _
U o n a , ^ . ^ d i 8 c r i m i n a t i o n i n v i o l a t i o n o f Ti _

icap » i A.L,K.4tn 144^

Ue v n

What constitutes handicap under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account
of handicap, 82 A.L.R.4th 26.
Nature and burden of proof in Title VII action alleging favoritism in promotion or job assignment due to sexual or romantic relation-

f c . v i l R.

htg A

f 1 % 4

u g c s

c c OA__

.
. * . A , „ „ , Qi_
» ZOOOerf seq.) 104 A.L.R Fed. 816.
Protection of debtor from acts of discnmination bv
Private e n t i t v a n d u n d e r § 525(b) of
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USCS § 525(b)),
105 A.L.R. Fed. 555.

34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim —
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings —
Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination.
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent,
make, sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under oath or
affirmation.
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall be filed
within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred.
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or
vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to
refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the commission a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly assign an investigator to attempt a
settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt
impartial investigation of all allegations made in the request for agency
action.
25
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(c) The commissioit and its staff, agents, and employees shall conduc
every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies involved, «i>
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear tha!
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has occurred.
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for agency
action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final order.
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the inves
tigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to support
the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set
out in the request for agency action the investigate >r shall formally report
these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director may issue a
determination and order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an eviden
tiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order
within 30 days of the date of the determination and order for dismissal.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determination and order issued by the director becomes the final order of the
commission.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful ai id the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support
the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set
out in the request for agency action, the Investigator shall formally report
these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director may issi le a
determination and order based on the investigator's report
(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an evidentiary
hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order within
30 days of the date of the determination and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determination and order issued by the director requiring the respondent to cease
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the final order of the commission.
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who investigated the
matter may not participate in a hearing except as a witness, nor may he
participate in the deliberations of the presiding officer.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the
request for agency action may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation,
and the respondent may amend its answer. Those amendments may be made
during or after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding officer.
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding officer finds t h a t
a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the
request for agency action containing the allegation of a discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice.
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be reimbursed
by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and costs.
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officer finds t h a t a
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to
cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide
28
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relief to the complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorneys' fees and costs.
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and facilitated at all
stages of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of the order
issued by the presiding officer in accordance with Section 63-46b-12.
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued by the
presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission.
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (ll)(a) is subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16.
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(14) The members of the commission and its staff may not divulge or make
public any information gained from any investigation, settlement negotiation,
or proceeding before the commission except in the following:
(a) Information used by the director in making any determination may
be provided to all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for and
participation in proceedings before the commission.
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided the identities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed.
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the attorney general
or other legal representatives of the state or commission.
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and reporting requirements of the federal government.
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion,
national origin, or handicap.
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for relief based
upon any act prohibited by this chapter bars the commencement or continuation of any adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in connection with the same claims under this chapter. Nothing in this
subsection is intended to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy
provision set forth in Subsection (15).
History: C. 1953, 34-35-7.1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 189, § 4; 1987, ch. 161, § 105; 1990,
ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 188, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "for
agency action" in Subsection (1Kb) and "for
agency action made under this section" in Subsection (lKc); substituted "request for agency
action" for "written charge" in Subsection (2),
"a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall
promptly assign an investigator" for "an adjudicative proceeding is set or held, the commission shall assign an investigator to the charge"
in Subsection (3)(a), and "all allegations made
in the request for agency action" for "the allegations made in the charge" in Subsection
(3)(b); deleted former Subsection (3)(c), relating

to the disclosure of information or settlement
efforts; redesignated former Subsection (3)fd)
as Subsection (3)(c); inserted Subsection (3)(d);
and rewrote the remainder of the section to the
extent that a detailed comparison would be impracticable.
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, inserted "discriminatory or" near the end
of Subsection (3)(c); added Subsection (4)(d);
substituted all of the present language of Subsection (8)(a) beginning with "request" for "director's determination and ending the adjudicative proceeding"; deleted "If a director's determination is dismissed" at the beginning of
Subsection (8Kb); added "and costs" at the end
of Subsection (9); substituted "issued by the
presiding officer" for "by the commission" in
Subsection (ll)(a); rewrote Subsections (12)
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and (13); and made minor changes in punctuation and style throughout the section.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
outside this chapter for such claims >.H.i*r>
;
Salt Lake County, 735 F. Supp .'te.:
- • ••
1990).

ANAI ¥818

Exclusive remedy.
No independent cause of action found

No independent c a u s e of action found.
Former county employee's claims of sexual
harassment and discrimination were preempted by this chapter, even though they were
cast as violations of other statutes or the Utah
Constitution. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735
F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990).

Exclusive remedy.
Claims that assert a different injury than
this statute covers, such as intentional tort
claims, and perhaps certain state constitutional claims, are not necessarily foreclosed by
the exclusive remedy provision of Subsection
(11) if an independent cause of action exists

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Award of front pay under state job
discrimination statutes, 74 A.L.R.4th 746.
Damages and other relief under state legis-

lation forbidding job discrimination on account
of handicap, 78 A.L.R.4th 435.

34-35-8. Repealed.
Repeals. — 1 *aws 1990, ch. 63, § 3 repeals
§ 34-35-8, as last amended by Laws 1986, ch.
47, § 15, relating to judicial review, effective

April 2J, 1990 For present comparable proviHitiiia, m;t* § 34- 35-7 1

CHAPTER 37
DECEPTION DETECTION EXAMINERS
nation of act.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Admissibility of lie delet'tor lest
results, or of offer or refuuu) IO take lesl, in

attorney disciplinary procerriinu Vf "'I 11 ill -lllli
hid

34-37-16. Surreptitious examinations prohibited.
NOTES TO DKCISIONS
cooperation with such practices. Berube v.
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah
1989)

ANAI YSIS

Purpose.
Refusal to submit to polygraph test.

Refusal to submit to polygraph t e s t
Subsection (2) applies only to surreptitious
deception detection examinations. This does
not include polygraph examinations. Berube v
Fashion Centre, I ,td., 771 P.2d 1033 (1 J tan
1989).

Purpose.
Subsection (2) protects employees or potential employees from termination where the employer informs them of the possibility of ongoing or future surreptitious examinations and
the applicants or employees refuse consent or
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History: C. 1953, 63-46b-ll, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 267; 1988, ch. 72, § 21.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted
"properly scheduled hearing afler receiving
proper notice" for "hearing" in Subsection
(l)(b); designated the existing provisions in
Subsection (3) as present Subsection (3)(a), inserting "and any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to the default or-

63-46b-12

der," and added Subsections (b) and (c); designated the existing provision in Subsection (4)
as present Subsection (4)(a), adding "In an adjudicative proceeding begun by a party that
has other parties besides the party in default,"
and added Subsection (b); and made minor stylistic changes.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.

63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rale.
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party.
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the
response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties
and to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the
agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other
filings, or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on
review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
733
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(7) Unless the petitioner and the agency agree in writing to an extension, if
an agency has not issued a declaratory order within 60 days after receipt of
the petition for a declaratory order, the petition is denied.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-21, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 277; 1988, ch. 72, § 27.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted
"Section 63-46b-9" for "Section 63-46b-10" in
Subsection (4)(a) and substituted "petition for

a declaratory order" for "request for a declaratory order" in Subsection (7).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.

63-46b-22. Transition procedures.
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, and judicial review
contained in this chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings
commenced by or before an agency on and after January 1, 1988.
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency review, and judicial
review that are in effect on December 31, 1987, govern all agency adjudicative
proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or before December 31,
1987, even if those proceedings are still pending before an agency or a court on
January 1, 1988.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-22, enacted by L.
1987 (1st S.S.), eh. 5, § 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1987 (1st S.S.), ch.
5, § 2 makes the act effective on June 3, 1987.

CHAPTER 47
COMMISSION ON STATUS OF WOMEN
Section
63-47-1.
63-47-2.
63-47-3.
63-47-4.
63-47-5.

Creation — Purpose.
Members — Appointment — Terms
— Vacancies.
Qualifications of members.
Election of chairman — Meetings.
Duties.

Section
63-47-6
63-47-7.
63-47-8

Administrative assistant — Appointment of personnel.
Authority to accept funds, gifts, and
donations.
Enactment of bylaws and rules.

63-47-1. Creation — Purpose.
There is hereby established the Governor's Commission on the Status of
Women. The purpose of the commission shall be to advise and confer with the
governor and state agencies concerning issues of importance to women and
families in Utah and to serve as a contact and co-ordinating group to analyze
state and local programs to determine whether they adequately serve women
and protect the rights of men, women and families.
History: L. 1973, ch. 173, § 1.

741

63-46b-16

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, $ 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except
that final agency action from informal adjudicative proceedings based on a record shall be
reviewed by the district courts on the record

according to the standards of Subsection
63-46b-16(4)" at the end in Subsection (l)(a)
and made minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 315 m a kes the act effective on January 1,
1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,

the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63«46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, efTective April 25, 1988, substituted "As
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals" for "The Supreme Court or
other appellate court designated by statute" in
Subsection (1); inserted "with the appropriate

appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and substituted "appellate rules of the appropriate appel late court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure" in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1,
j^gg

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency
decisions through formal adjudicative proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis-

trict court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to
§ 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

63-46b-17, Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 273.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,

§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.
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